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In late November 2011, the U.S. Supreme Court denied
certiorari in United States v. Faulkner,1 an outcome that, in the larger
scheme of things, should not warrant attention; the Court denies
thousands of such petitions every year.2 By deciding not to reexamine
Faulkner, however, the Court failed to settle a matter dividing the
federal courts: whether discovery by police of an arrest warrant during
an illegal seizure constitutes an intervening circumstance sufficient to
purge the taint of the seizure, allowing use of evidence secured by an
attendant search. As a consequence of the Court’s certiorari denial,
criminal defendants can be prosecuted in the Eighth Circuit on the
basis of such evidence,3 as can defendants in the Seventh Circuit,4 yet
those in the Sixth,5 Ninth,6 and Tenth Circuits7 cannot.
That Fourth Amendment doctrine differs based on geographic
happenstance would likely come as a surprise to most Americans, who
believe—as John Jay put it in the Federalist Papers—that “we have
uniformly been one people; each individual citizen everywhere
enjoying the same national rights, privileges, protection.”8 However,
1.
636 F.3d 1009 (8th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 761 (2011).
2.
See The Supreme Court—The Statistics, 125 HARV . L. REV. 362, 369 (2011) (noting that
the Court granted only 1.1% of 7,868 petitions filed in its 2010 Term).
3.
Faulkner, 636 F.3d at 1015–17.
4.
See United States v. Green, 111 F.3d 515, 521–23 (7th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S.
973 (1997).
5.
See United States v. Gross, 662 F.3d 393, 405–06 (6th Cir. 2011).
6.
See United States v. Luckett, 484 F.2d 89, 90–91 (9th Cir. 1973).
7.
See United States v. Lopez, 443 F.3d 1280, 1286 (10th Cir. 2006).
8.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 2, at 38–39 (John Jay) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); see also, e.g.,
RICHARD H. FALLON, J R., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION 130 (2001) (“[O]ur sense of national
identity as a people literally constituted by the Constitution is linked indissolubly with ideals of
common constitutional rights . . . . [N]ational ideals require national enforcement as an
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the outcome in Faulkner, and many other instances in which
intermediate federal courts differ on constitutional questions, belies
this understanding. On questions not yet squarely resolved by the
Supreme Court, the nation’s twelve general jurisdiction federal courts
of appeals decide as they see fit,9 subject only to a norm of intracircuit
stare decisis.10 And because the Court agrees to hear only a fraction of
cases in which circuit courts differ,11 the decisions of federal appellate
courts irreducibly “set the legal ground rules for citizens.”12
While circuit splits have been the subject of frequent scholarly
attention, research and debate has focused on federal civil (typically
statutory) law, not constitutional doctrine.13 So conceived, splits
garnering the Court’s certiorari attention have been characterized as
often “trivial” in nature,14 and prompted the view that associated
“problems of disuniformity are very much overstated.”15 This Article
redresses this empirical deficit relative to constitutional law and
reaches the opposite conclusions. Focusing in particular on Fourth
Amendment doctrine, with its significant everyday impact on the
affirmation of our shared nationhood.”); James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State
Constitutionalism, 90 MICH. L. REV. 762, 824 (1992) (“Our constitutional language and culture
hold the U.S. Constitution to be the repository of the fundamental values of the national
community, a community to which every citizen belongs.”).
9.
See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 3, at 11
(7th ed. 2011) (noting existence of eleven numbered circuit courts of appeals, encompassing
states and territories, and the court of appeals for the District of Columbia). In addition to the
twelve geographically arrayed courts of general jurisdiction, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals
hears specialized federal appeals such as those concerning patents and cases decided by the
Court of Federal Claims. Id.
10. See infra notes 38–39 and accompanying text.
11. See Tracey E. George & Chris Guthrie, Remaking the United States Supreme Court in
the Courts’ of Appeals Image, 58 DUKE L.J. 1439, 1449 (2009) (recognizing that the Court
addresses less than half of the circuit splits identified by litigants).
12. FRANK B. CROSS, DECISION MAKING IN THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS 2 (2007); see also
id. (“[I]n large measure, it is the circuit courts that create U.S. law. They represent the iceberg,
of which the Supreme Court is but the most basic visible tip. The circuit courts play by far the
greatest legal policymaking role in the U.S. judicial system.”); Richard A. Posner, Judicial
Behavior and Performance: An Economic Approach, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1259, 1273 (2005)
(“Entire fields of law are left mainly to the courts of appeals to shape.”).
13. See, e.g., Mary Garvey Algero, A Step in the Right Direction: Reducing Intercircuit
Conflicts by Strengthening the Value of Federal Appellate Court Decisions, 70 TENN. L. REV. 605,
608 (2003); Martha Dragich, Uniformity, Inferiority, and the Law of the Circuit Doctrine, 56 LOY.
L. REV. 535, 549 (2010); Amanda Frost, Overvaluing Uniformity, 94 VA. L. REV. 1567, 1569
(2008).
14. Frost, supra note 13, at 1634–35; J. Harvie Wilkinson III, If It Ain’t Broke…, 119 YALE
L.J. ONLINE 67, 69 (2010).
15. Wilkinson, supra note 14, at 69; see also Frost, supra note 13, at 1569 (“It appears the
Supreme Court selected these issues for review solely because the lower courts were divided, not
because the issues were of great significance for the nation.”).
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nation’s populace,16 the Article highlights the existence of over three
dozen extant circuit splits. Moreover, as the results reported on here
make clear, splits do not, as Court of Appeals Judge Harvie Wilkinson
has posited, get resolved because “the Court can be counted upon to
weigh in.”17 As a consequence, the rights of individuals, and the
authority of law enforcement to conduct searches and seizures, vary in
nature and scope throughout the land, often for extended periods of
time.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides an overview of
the empirical work conducted to date on circuit splits. Most notable
among these efforts are the landmark studies undertaken by Professor
Arthur Hellman, who examined splits in terms of their effect
(“intolerability”) and longevity (“persistence”). Like others, Professor
Hellman focused on civil law and concluded that splits discerned in his
study sample were not problematic under either measure. While
alluding to the fact that variant circuit positions on constitutional
criminal procedure matters could be outcome determinative, and thus
raise equal treatment concerns, the study ignored the splits because,
unlike areas such as federal tax and labor law, they did not affect
“multicircuit actors.”18
Part II discusses the results of a study that examines the
nature and extent of Fourth Amendment circuit splits. Drawing on a
variety of sources, including a Westlaw database search covering a
ten-year period, the study reveals the existence of more than three
dozen issues on which federal circuits currently differ (in several
instances reflecting more than two positions). The issues pertain to a
broad range of matters that commonly arise in federal criminal cases,
concerning police search and seizure practices, the application and
reach of the exclusionary rule, and appellate standards of review.
Furthermore, despite the Supreme Court’s averred concern over
disuniformity,19 and the expectation that splits bear special weight in
16. See THOMAS K. CLANCY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ITS HISTORY AND INTERPRETATION
xix (2008) (observing that the Fourth Amendment “is the most commonly implicated and
litigated part of our Constitution” and that it serves as “the foundation upon which other
freedoms rest”).
17. Wilkinson, supra note 14, at 71–72.
18. See infra notes 51–65 and accompanying text.
19. See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 415–16 (1821) (Marshall, C.J.)
(asserting “the necessity of uniformity” and that “nothing but contradiction and confusion can
proceed” from the Court’s failure to resolve constitutional conflict); Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14
U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 347–48 (1816) (Story, J.) (emphasizing “the importance, and even necessity
of uniformity of decisions throughout the whole United States, upon all subjects within the
purview of the constitution” and condemning disuniformity as “truly deplorable”). For a more
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its certiorari process,20 the Court regularly fails to reconcile the
conflicts, ensuring that the divergent outcomes endure and multiply
with the passage of time. Part II closes with a discussion of how and
why the splits arise and persist, a phenomenon that is itself curious
given the increasingly conservative ideological tenor of the federal
judiciary, a majority of Supreme Court Justices typically unenamored
of Fourth Amendment protections, and the Court’s purported desire
for clarity in Fourth Amendment doctrine.
Part III examines the normative and practical implications of
the splits. For some time, a spirited debate has existed over whether
intercircuit conflict in general is problematic. Indeed, those dubious of
whether concern is warranted often maintain that splits actually have
salutary effect: first, allowing for the geographically based circuits to
experiment, much as federalism permits states to serve as
Brandeisian laboratories;21 and second, permitting views to “percolate”
over time, enhancing the jurisprudential quality of eventual Supreme
Court outcomes.22 Neither contention enjoys support, however. Not
only are constitutional rights not the proper subject of
experimentation, as the Court itself has insisted, but the circuits
themselves can scarcely be thought regionally cohesive or
representative (for instance the Sixth Circuit encompasses both
Tennessee and Michigan), and judges on circuit panels need not even
hail from within the circuit on which they sit. Likewise, based on the
study’s findings, the avowed benefits of percolation do not significantly
manifest in the Fourth Amendment decisions ultimately rendered by
the Court.23
Part III then surveys the broader consequences of the splits
uncovered. Perhaps most fundamentally, the splits undermine the
nation’s sense of shared constitutional culture, highlighting the
recent pronouncement to this same effect, see Justices in Their Own Words: Granting Certiorari
(C-SPAN television broadcast June 19, 2009), available at http://supremecourt.cspan.org/Video/JusticeOwnWords.aspx (Chief Justice John Roberts) (“Our main job is to try to
make sure [that] federal law is uniform across the country.”).
20. See SUP. CT. R. 10(a) (specifying as a “compelling reason” to grant a certiorari petition
that “a United States court of appeals has entered a decision in conflict with the decision of
another United States court of appeals on the same important matter”); see also Edward A.
Hartnett, Questioning Certiorari: Some Reflections Seventy-Five Years After the Judges’ Bill, 100
COLUM. L. REV. 1643, 1685, 1697–98 (2000) (noting testimony of Chief Justice Taft and Justice
Van Devanter before Congress on how the expansion of the Court’s certiorari prerogative and
discretionary docket, with adoption of the Judges’ Bill of 1925, would promote uniformity in
federal law).
21. See infra notes 156–58 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 182–84 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 187–95 and accompanying text.
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inability of the courts of a single sovereign—the U.S. Government,
perceived by most Americans as the prime expositor of national
constitutional law24—to render consistent constitutional outcomes.25
Splits also create a variety of practical difficulties: they present
difficult choice of law questions when federal prosecutions entail police
work crossing circuit boundaries; complicate whether a right is
“clearly established” in constitutional tort litigation or “settled” for
purposes of the “good faith” exception to the exclusionary rule; and
contribute to possible federal forum shopping.26
Part IV considers how best to redress these difficulties. As the
results reported on here make clear, the mechanism now used to
resolve splits—discretionary certiorari—is not up to the task. Even
though the Court’s plenary docket is now smaller than at any time in
its recent history,27 splits persist on numerous Fourth Amendment
issues, many of which can figure critically in federal criminal
prosecutions. Any solution, moreover, is complicated by the relative
lack of institutional options available: while Congress can clarify,
amend, or repeal a federal statute variously interpreted by circuits,
only the Court can definitively resolve a constitutional conflict.28 As
repeated failed reform efforts over the past several decades make
clear, however, the Court is remarkably successful in neutralizing
changes perceived as undercutting its discretionary docket authority
and supremacy. Mindful of this reality, Part IV urges resuscitation by
Congress of the federal certification statute, which has long
empowered circuit courts to certify legal questions to the Court for
authoritative determination, and proposes several ways in which the
law can be modified to ensure that the Court fulfills its
24. See JAMES A. GARDNER, INTERPRETING STATE C ONSTITUTIONS 23 (2005) (“When
Americans speak of ‘constitutional law,’ they invariably mean the U.S. Constitution and the
substantial body of federal judicial decisions construing it.”). Of course, state courts also enjoy
authority to interpret the Federal Constitution and their decisions can engender disuniformity.
However, the discussion here is limited to intrafederal judicial disagreement, involving the
varied judgments of a single sovereign’s courts, which raises a distinct array of concerns. In
future work, I plan to address the contributing role of state courts.
25. See infra Part 3.B.1
26. See infra Part 3.B.2.
27. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Starr, The Supreme Court and Its Shrinking Docket: The Ghost of
William Howard Taft, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1363, 1366 (2006) (noting that we are witnessing the
“great disappearing merits docket”); David R. Stras, The Supreme Court’s Declining Plenary
Docket: A Membership-Based Explanation, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 151, 152 (2010) (characterizing
recent decline in the Court’s plenary docket as “extraordinary”); Linda Greenhouse, On the Court
That Defied Labeling, Kennedy Made the Boldest Mark, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2008, at A1 (noting
that the 2008 Term resulted in the fewest number of opinions of any since 1953).
28. See infra notes 311–12 and accompanying text.
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superintendent role. Doing so, it is hoped, will at once cure the
difficulties created by splits and reinvigorate a now-decayed but oncemeaningful interactive relationship between the intermediate federal
courts and the Supreme Court that oversees them.
I. BACKGROUND AND PRIOR EMPIRICAL WORK
Federal judicial power, as Article III provides, is vested in “one
supreme Court” and such “inferior Courts as the Congress may from
time to time ordain and establish.”29 Acting on its prerogative,
Congress in 1789 created a network of thirteen district courts to
preside over trials and three circuit courts (Eastern, Southern, and
Middle) to handle a hybrid docket of trial and appellate matters. 30
Congress refrained from designating judges for the circuit courts,
instead directing that they be staffed by “any two justices of the
Supreme Court, and the district judge of such districts.”31 In 1802, the
number of circuits was expanded to six, each again consisting of
Justices and district court judges.32 Later, in 1869, a circuit judge was
assigned to each circuit, with the two other judges on the threemember panels drawn from among the district court judges and
Supreme Court Justices.33 With the change and concomitant
stabilization of the previously shifting geographic boundaries of
circuits, as Erwin Surrency has noted, “[T]he circuits took on a new
significance.”34
Not until 1891, however, with the enactment of the Circuit
Courts of Appeals Act (Evarts Act),35 did the modern federal judicial
system take shape. The two-tier system was modified to include a
third, intermediate tier of courts designated to hear appeals,
replicating the geographic regions of then-extant circuits.36 The
circuits, for the first time assuming distinct, formalized status, were
looked upon as a mechanism to relieve the heavy appellate burden of
the Supreme Court and lend reasoned consistency to federal law in the
growing nation. Yet, from the outset, creation of an intermediate tier

29.
30.

U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 3, 1 Stat. 73, 74–75; see also ERWIN C. SURRENCY,
HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL COURTS 21–27 (1987).
31. § 4, 1 Stat. at 74.
32. Act of Apr. 29, 1802, ch. 21, § 4, 2 Stat. 156, 157–58.
33. Act of Apr. 10, 1869, ch. 22, § 2, 16 Stat. 44, 44–45.
34. SURRENCY, supra note 30, at 40.
35. The Circuit Courts of Appeals Act of 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826.
36. Id. § 2.
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of federal appellate courts prompted worry, including from the bill’s
sponsor, New York Senator William Evarts, that “diverse tribunals in
geographical distribution” would sow confusion in “all that we had
secured heretofore by a uniformity of conclusions.”37
Subsequent experience amply supported Senator Evart’s
concern. While expected to seek intracircuit uniformity,38 federal
intermediate courts were not required to respect or defer to positions
taken by other circuits.39 As a result, independently derived “law of
the circuit”—largely insulated from reconciliation due to what was
seen as the Supreme Court’s excessive docket40—prompted concern.41
In time, decisional disuniformity among the federal circuits
prompted creation of several high-profile study groups and
commissions comprised of prominent jurists, policymakers,
practitioners, and academics.42 Of the major initiatives, two in
37. 21 CONG. REC. S10221 (Sept. 19, 1890) (statement of Sen. Evarts); see also, e.g., 21
CONG. REC. 3407–08 (1890) (comment of Rep. Breckenridge) (expressing concern over “diversities
of judgment”).
38. See, e.g., United States v. Guzman, 419 F.3d 27, 31 (1st Cir. 2005) (noting that later
panels are “firmly bound” by decisions of earlier panels and referring to the requirement as the
“law-of-the-circuit” doctrine); see also Stephen L. Wasby, Inconsistency in the United States
Courts of Appeals: Dimensions and Mechanisms for Resolution, 32 VAND. L. REV. 1343, 1344
(1979).
39. Mast, Foos & Co. v. Stover Mfg. Co., 177 U.S. 485, 488 (1900); see also Laurie R.
Wallach, Intercircuit Conflicts and the Enforcement of Extracircuit Judgments, 95 YALE L.J.
1500, 1500 (1986) (“Circuits lack the executive and legislative attributes of sovereignty that
make jurisdictional boundaries meaningful; yet, though they are merely arms of a single
sovereign, they enjoy independence from one another when interpreting federal law . . . .
[C]ircuits [are] something ‘less’ sovereign than states but ‘more’ than mere coordinate courts . . .
.”).
40. See Warren E. Burger, Annual Report on the State of the Judiciary, 69 A.B.A. J. 442,
445–46 (1983) (contending that a “clear majority” of Justices felt that “something must be done”
about Court’s caseload); Paul D. Carrington, Crowded Dockets and the Courts of Appeals: The
Threat to the Function of Review and the National Law, 82 HARV. L. REV. 542, 580 (1969) (“The
‘law of the circuit’ has emerged as a response to the Supreme Court’s incapacity to resolve
intercircuit conflicts.”). At least one commentator, however, offered that the Court’s docket
selection choices, including unimportant cases, and penchant for plurality opinions, belied
assertions of excessive caseload. See Arthur D. Hellman, Caseload, Conflicts, and Decisional
Capacity: Does the Supreme Court Need Help?, 67 JUDICATURE 28, 32–34 (1983).
41. See, e.g., Carrington, supra note 40, at 596 (condemning “the instability of intercircuit
conflicts produced by the balkanized system of separate circuits”); Erwin Griswold, Rationing
Justice—The Supreme Court’s Caseload and What the Court Does Not Do, 60 CORNELL L. REV.
335, 342 (1974) (observing that “sharply rationed review” by the Supreme Court means “it is
hard to say that there is any national law on many subjects”); Shirley Hufstedter, Courtship and
Other Legal Arts, 60 A.B.A. J. 545, 546–47 (1974) (lamenting the “lack of certitude” in national
law due to insufficient “ironing out” of “wrinkles”).
42. See ADVISORY COUNCIL FOR A PPELLATE JUSTICE, 4 APPELLATE JUSTICE : 1975 (Paul
Carrington et al. eds., 1975); AM. BAR FOUND., ACCOMMODATING THE WORKLOAD OF THE UNITED
STATES COURTS OF APPEALS (1968); COMM ’N ON REVISION OF THE FED. COURT APPELLATE SYS .,
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particular stand out. The first, headed by Senator Roman Hruska of
Nebraska, issued its final report in 1975 and drew attention to the
“multiplicity” of federal circuits generating “intercircuit conflict” and
“disharmony.”43 Focusing on a sample of Supreme Court certiorari
petitions in the 1971 and 1972 terms, the Commission found that at
least five percent of the cases in which review was denied involved a
“direct” conflict, a volume equivalent to one-half the total number of
cases to which the Court actually afforded plenary consideration at
the time.44
The Hruska Commission deemed the volume of unresolved
conflicts “impressive,”45 and expressed its concern that “differences in
legal rules applied by the same circuits result in unequal treatment of
citizens . . . solely because of differences in geography.”46 In the face of
this variability, the Commission urged “creation of a new national
court of appeals, designed to increase the capacity of the judicial
system for definitive adjudication of issues of national law.”47 The
suggestion, however, subjected to sharp criticism by those fearing
diminished Supreme Court institutional authority and prestige, failed
to get beyond the stage of congressional hearings.48
Fifteen years later, a second major congressionally sponsored
initiative, spearheaded by the Federal Courts Study Committee in
1990, also addressed circuit conflicts.49 While disavowing the need for
a national court of appeals, the Study Committee, like the Hruska
Commission before it, expressed alarm, urging that the Federal
Judicial Center “study the number and frequency of unresolved
conflicts” to learn how many were “intolerable,” defined as those:
“[I]mpos[ing] economic costs or other harm to multi-circuit actors”;

STRUCTURE AND INTERNAL PROCEDURES: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE, reprinted in 67
F.R.D. 195 (1975) [hereinafter HRUSKA COMMISSION REPORT]; REPORT OF THE STUDY GROUP OF
THE CASELOAD OF THE SUPREME COURT, 57 F.R.D. 573 (1972) [hereinafter FREUND COMMITTEE
REPORT]. For a helpful overview of the extended series of reform efforts, see Thomas E. Baker, A
Generation Spent Studying the United States Courts of Appeals: A Chronology, 34 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 395 (2000).
43. HRUSKA COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 42, at 206–07.
44. Id. at 221–22.
45. Id. at 206–07.
46. Id. at 206–07, 222.
47. Id. at 208.
48. See AM. ENTER. INST., PROPOSALS FOR A NATIONAL COURT OF APPEALS 27–36 (1977)
(discussing failure of the Hruska Commission, as well as similar prior effort of the Freund
Committee); Todd E. Thompson, Increasing Uniformity and Capacity in the Federal Appellate
System, 11 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 457, 474–81 (1984).
49. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY
COMMITTEE 3 (1990).
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“encourag[ing] forum shopping among circuits”;
“creat[ing] unfairness to litigants in different circuits—for example by allowing federal
benefits in one circuit that are denied elsewhere”; or
“encourag[ing] ‘non-acquiescence’ by federal administrative agencies, by forcing them to
choose between the uniform administration of statutory schemes and obedience to the
different holdings of courts in different regions.” 50

Accepting the challenge, the Federal Judicial Center appointed
Professor Arthur Hellman to assess the extent and nature of circuit
splits.
Professor Hellman’s study, published in 1995,51 focused on two
groups of cases in which the Supreme Court denied certiorari52 and
concluded that the number of unresolved conflicts was larger than
that suggested by prior research.53 Professor Hellman concluded,
however, that the splits deemed “intolerable” or “persistent,” based on
the Federal Judicial Center’s criteria, did not present a problem of
“serious magnitude.”54 While noting the existence of constitutional
criminal procedure conflicts,55 and alluding to the “unfairness” of
varied results,56 the study failed to elaborate on their precise nature or
ramifications.57 Symptomatic of this, when focusing on a split’s “effect
on outcome,” a key measure of intolerability,58 Professor Hellman
omitted discussion of criminal procedure cases.59 He felt free to do so
because the conflicts would not affect private “multicircuit actors,”
who would need to adjust their behavior to “different holdings . . . in
50. Id. at 124–27.
51. Arthur D. Hellman, By Precedent Unbound: The Nature and Extent of Unresolved
Intercircuit Conflicts, 56 U. PITT . L. REV. 693, 697 (1995).
52. One group consisted of all cases in which Justice Byron White (well known for his
concern over unresolved circuit disuniformity) dissented from a denial of certiorari during the
1988–1990 Terms. Id. at 705. The other group contained a random selection of non–in forma
pauperis cases in which certiorari was denied during the 1989 Term. Id. at 706.
53. Id. at 772. Professor Hellman acknowledged that focus on Justice White’s dissents
likely undercounted conflicts because White did not always dissent when certiorari was denied in
the face of a conflict. Id. at 724.
54. Id. at 797.
55. Id. at 728–29.
56. Id. at 756–57; see also id. at 759–60 (noting that “few of the rules are party neutral”
and that “because liberty is at stake, concerns about equal treatment will be implicated even
when the rules regulate only mediate steps in the adjudicative process”).
57. See id. at 749 (noting that some forty percent of the conflicts in the random group and
more than half of the White dissent group concerned “the constitutional rights of criminal
defendants or the elements of federal crimes”).
58. Id. at 785 (“[T]he key to tolerability is effect on outcomes. Unless the choice between
the competing rules leads courts to reach divergent results in similar cases, none of the
consequences that concerned the Study Committee are likely to materialize.”).
59. Id. at 759–60.
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different regions.”60 Ignoring the effect that circuit disagreement has
on individual criminal defendants, Professor Hellman observed that
the federal government—which pursues jurisdiction-specific
prosecutions—would not be adversely affected.61
A follow-up study by Professor Hellman, tracking the
subsequent history of unresolved circuit conflicts in his initial study,
likewise largely failed to focus on conflicts concerning constitutional
criminal procedure rights. The study, like that of the Hruska
Commission,62 singled out as potentially problematic only circuit
disagreements pertaining to labor and tax law.63 When the study did
fleetingly focus on criminal procedure disagreements, it similarly
downplayed their effect on defendants,64 dismissing their importance
again because the federal government (unlike a business) is not a
private “multicircuit” actor.65
II. THE PRESENT STUDY
As the foregoing suggests, federal circuit splits on
constitutional doctrine, including criminal procedure, have not gone
wholly undetected. Nevertheless, researchers, while noting the
existence of such splits and alluding to the unique problems they

60. Id. at 749.
61. Id.
62. HRUSKA COMMISSION REPORT , supra note 42, at 145–51 (singling out tax as a problem
area); id. at 154–57 (singling out labor law); see also Carrington, supra note 40, at 611 (labor);
Todd Miller, A Court of Tax Appeals Revisited, 85 YALE L.J. 228, 228–29 (1975) (tax).
63. Arthur D. Hellman, Never the Same River Twice: The Empirics and Epistemology of
Intercircuit Conflicts, 63 U. PITT. L. REV. 81, 123–24 (2001) (identifying as the “paradigm of the
outcome-determinative conflict” varied views on how mutual fund shares in a decedent’s estate
should be valued for federal tax purposes). Professor Hellman did briefly advert to Fourth
Amendment conflict but dismissed the significance of the conflict as lacking in practical effect.
See id. at 125 (noting cases in which “[t]he circuits disagreed over whether a warrantless search
of an automobile requires exigent circumstances as well as probable cause, but the standard for
exigency was so undemanding that no search was held unlawful because the requirement was
not satisfied”).
64. See Arthur D. Hellman, Light on a Darkling Plain: Intercircuit Conflicts in the
Perspective of Time and Experience, 1998 SUP. CT. REV. 247, 253 (stating that unresolved circuit
splits would have little impact on criminal defendants); see also id. at 263–64 (noting split
regarding jury exposure to extrinsic material and right to a new trial but concluding that it was
not “the dispositive factor in determining case outcomes”). Emblematic of the common research
emphasis on civil law, Professor Hellman augmented his study with field surveys to get the
views of practitioners on the practical difficulties and challenges presented by conflicts, singling
out for attention antitrust, ERISA, labor and employment, and maritime law. Id. at 273–74.
65. Hellman, supra note 63, at 121 n.154.
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present,66 have failed to systematically chronicle their nature and
extent. This Part discusses the results of a study intended to remedy
this empirical deficit, focusing on Fourth Amendment doctrine in
particular, a domain where circuit splits can have a particularly direct
effect on individual liberty and privacy.
A. Findings
A variety of data sources were consulted. In contrast to prior
work, which assessed splits in a “top down” fashion by focusing on
certiorari grants or denials by the Court, the present study adopted a
“bottom up” approach, focusing on splits that arose among the courts
of appeals themselves. This strategy allowed for a fuller illumination
of the splits for several reasons. First, focus on certiorari outcomes
alone risks underinclusiveness, due to the possibility that certiorari
was not actually sought or because the split preceded or followed the
study period. Moreover, and more important, focusing on certiorari
petitions, which number in the tens of thousands, necessitates resort
to sampling, which fails to reflect the nature and extent of splits.
Finally, certiorari-focused studies typically have omitted coverage of
in forma pauperis petitions, which, while perhaps a sensible means of
reducing the enormous volume of cases, can adversely skew results in
the criminal justice context, where impecunious defendants
predominate and often lack a right to appointed counsel in the
certiorari process.67
Here, a Westlaw search was conducted of federal court of
appeals decisions rendered over a ten-year period (September 1, 2001
to December 1, 2011),68 augmented by review of the “Split Circuits”
blog69 and the “Circuit Splits” service of U.S. Law Week,70 as well as
66. See, e.g., Dragich, supra note 13, at 549 n.77 (disclaiming focus on circuit constitutional
disuniformity and stating that “[o]f course, individual rights ought to be protected uniformly
throughout the country”); Frost, supra note 13, at 1569 n.5 (acknowledging that “varied
interpretation of federal constitutional law raises different, and arguably more troubling,
questions”).
67. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 530 U.S. 1305 (2000) (simultaneously granting
petitioner motion to proceed in forma pauperis and petition for writ of certiorari). See generally
STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG & DANIEL J. CAPRA , AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: CASES AND
COMMENTARY 849–51 (9th ed. 2010) (surveying post-trial limits on availability of governmentappointed counsel).
68. The following query was used in the “cta” database (containing all intermediate federal
court cases): division divide! conflict! split inconsisten! differ! disagree! uncertain! /p “court of
appeal” circuit “federal court” & fourth “4th amendment” “amend. 4” search seiz!.
69. See A. Benjamin Spencer, SPLIT C IRCUITS, http://splitcircuits.blogspot.com (last visited
Dec. 10, 2011).

1b. Logan_Ready for PAGE(Do Not Delete)

2012]

CONSTITUTIONAL CACOPHONY

10/18/2012 8:06 AM

1149

the author’s monitoring of Fourth Amendment circuit splits more
generally. The strategy was designed to yield the fullest, most
comprehensive picture of splits during the study period.
The study employed a conservative definition of a split, only
identifying instances when a court of appeals explicitly acknowledged
one to be in existence.71 As a result, the study avoided counting
instances when courts disregarded or engaged in superficial
distinction of conflicting extracircuit precedent, a not uncommon
occurrence,72 which if counted would introduce an unhelpful
definitional uncertainty.73 The study revealed that—at this time74—
more than three dozen splits exist on Fourth Amendment matters in
the courts of appeals. Appendix A indicates the issues on which the
courts are split and the dates on which the splits emerged.
The splits, organized in terms of those relating to general
search and seizure practices, the applicability and reach of the
exclusionary rule, and appellate review, concern an array of Fourth
Amendment issues that regularly arise in federal criminal cases. For
instance, in terms of search and seizure practices, circuit variation can
determine whether police can:


“sweep” a residence when no one is arrested on the
premises;



extend the duration of a seizure by asking questions
unrelated to the basis for the seizure;

70. See Split Circuits, USLAW, http://www.uslaw.com/law_blogs/Split+Circuits?blog=47
(last visited Dec. 10, 2011).
71. An approach like that recently used by Professors George and Solimine. See Tracey E.
George & Michael E. Solimine, Supreme Court Monitoring of the United States Courts of Appeals
En Banc, 9 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 171, 188 (2001) (classifying “a case as involving an intercircuit
split only if any member of the panel explicitly stated that another circuit or circuits had reached
a different decision in analogous circumstances and if the conflict was express and direct rather
than merely a matter of general or logical inconsistency”); see also Arthur D. Hellman, Breaking
the Banc: The Common-Law Process in the Large Appellate Court, 23 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 915, 922–41
(1991) (adopting a similar approach).
72. See, e.g., United States v. Poe, 556 F.3d 1113, 1123–24 (10th Cir. 2009) (adopting a
narrow view of whether private actors qualify as government agents, ignoring a contrary position
adopted by Fourth Circuit in Jackson v. Pantazes, 810 F.2d 426, 430 (4th Cir. 1987)).
73. At the same time, the study excluded federal circuit splits acknowledged by non-circuit
courts. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Narcisse, 927 N.E.2d 439, 446–47 (Mass. 2010) (noting
federal circuit variation on whether police can conduct a protective Terry frisk of an individual
subject to a consensual encounter, absent reasonable suspicion that the individual is or was
involved in criminal activity).
74. The study also did not take into account aged but still extant splits that that did not
manifest during the study period. See infra note 114.
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illegally seize an individual and use identity-related
evidence secured to prosecute the detainee for an
unrelated crime;



search an area incident to arrest after the arrestee has
left the area;



enter a home without a warrant based on the
“community caretaking” doctrine;



seize an individual based on a mistaken understanding
of substantive law; and



rely on information that has not been communicated to
the arresting officer by another officer to justify a search
or seizure.75

Exclusionary rule variations are no less significant. They can
also have an outcome-determinative effect—such as in United States
v. Faulkner, noted at the outset, when police unlawfully detain an
individual, learn that he is subject to an outstanding arrest warrant,
and then arrest and search him, resulting in discovery of evidence
leading to an unrelated criminal prosecution.76 Likewise, circuit-level
disagreement can affect whether a defendant has standing to
challenge police action, such as when a rental car is searched and the
driver is operating the car with the renter’s permission but does not
appear on the rental agreement.77 Finally, circuit disagreement on
appellate standards of review can have significant impact. It can, for
instance, determine how much deference is owed lower court
assessments of protectable curtilage around a home and the scope of
consent provided by a defendant in a search.78

75.
76.
77.
78.

See infra Appendix A.
See infra Appendix A.
See infra Appendix A.
See infra Appendix A.
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B. Assessing Intolerability and Persistence
The intercircuit variation highlighted here is problematic in
terms of both measures employed by prior research: intolerability and
persistence.79
1. Intolerability
As a consequence of the variation, the “right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects”80 is allowed to
hinge on geographic happenstance,81 resulting in varied protection
against infringements on individuals’ privacy and physical liberty
(both immediate, as the result of a particular seizure, and long term,
as a result of imprisonment).82 Two examples of the many instances of
circuit disuniformity uncovered here highlight the impact of this
variability.
A first example concerns the authority of police to search
incident to a lawful arrest, one of the most commonly invoked
exceptions to the default expectation that police secure a warrant
before searching a person or property.83 Police have long possessed
79. See supra notes 50–54 and accompanying text.
80. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
81. Whether the Fourth Amendment ensures a collective or individual right of privacy and
bodily security has long been the source of debate. See, e.g., Donald L. Dorenberg, The Right of
the People: Reconciling Collective and Individual Interests Under the Fourth Amendment, 58
N.Y.U. L. REV. 259, 282–83 (1983) (noting contrast between the Court’s view of the exclusionary
rule as serving the collective interest in deterring police misconduct (versus vindicating
individual rights), and its approach to standing, which is conditioned on whether an individual
has a right to contest a search or seizure). The circuit splits identified here, however, implicate
the distinct question of rights being available to some but not other “people,” based not on
personal circumstance but rather on specific geographic location within the larger national
political community. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1990) (“ ‘[T]he
people’ seems to have been a term of art employed in select parts of the Constitution . . . . [Its
use] suggests that ‘the people’ protected by the Fourth Amendment . . . refers to a class of
persons who are part of a national community . . . .”).
82. The doctrinal variation, moreover, is not always dichotomous in form. While circuits
most often divide into two jurisprudential camps, they can also reflect three or more approaches
to a particular issue, magnifying the nature and scope of variation. Multicircuit splits exist, for
example, on the issue of the definition of “reason to believe” sufficient to justify entering the
home of the target of an arrest warrant, see United States v. Hill, 649 F.3d 258, 262–63 (4th Cir.
2011); the standard used to assess whether police would have inevitably discovered challenged
evidence in the absence of an unlawful search, see United States v. Marrocco, 578 F.3d 627, 640
n.24 (7th Cir. 2009); and whether an unauthorized driver of a rental vehicle, driving with the
permission of the renter, has standing to challenge a vehicle search, see United States v.
Thomas, 447 F.3d 1191, 1196–99 (9th Cir. 2006).
83. See 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 5.2(b) (4th ed. 2004) (noting that only
consensual searches exceed in volume searches incident to arrest).
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search incident authority,84 allowing them to remove any weapons or
evidence possessed by the arrestee.85 Over time, however, the
parameters of the authority have been disputed. In its seminal 1969
decision Chimel v. California, the Supreme Court held in the context
of an in-house arrest that police can search an arrestee’s area of
“immediate control,” including the “area into which the arrestee might
reach.”86 Twelve years later, in Belton v. New York, a case involving
the arrest of a motorist, the Court expanded the right in an important
way, while professing to merely apply Chimel to the “particular and
problematic context” of auto searches.87 The Belton Court afforded
police a per se right to search an auto’s passenger compartment and
any containers found therein,88 expanding police search authority to
areas often beyond the actual physical reach of arrestees.89
Notwithstanding Belton’s limiting language, several circuits—
including the Fourth,90 Fifth,91 Seventh,92 Eighth,93 and D.C.
Circuits94—have applied Belton beyond the auto search context, while
others—such as the Third95—adhere to Chimel’s focus on whether an
area searched was actually within the “grab area” of an arrestee. As a
result, whether police can search an area depends on the circuit in
which an arrest occurs. If an arrest occurs in a circuit affording police
greater authority, a search is permitted even if the arrestee is
handcuffed, or otherwise safely constrained by police, and can extend

84. See Wayne A. Logan, An Exception Swallows a Rule: Police Authority to Search
Incident to Arrest, 19 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 381, 385–90 (2001).
85. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762–63 (1969).
86. Id. at 763.
87. 453 U.S. 454, 460 n.3 (1981).
88. Id. at 460.
89. See id. at 466 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (asserting that the majority “adopt[ed] a
fiction—that the interior of a car is always within the immediate control of an arrestee who has
recently been in the car”).
90. United States v. Silva, 745 F.2d 840, 847 (4th Cir. 1984).
91. United States v. Johnson, 846 F.2d 279, 281–82 (5th Cir. 1988).
92. United States v. Tejada, 524 F.3d 809, 812 (7th Cir. 2008).
93. United States v. Palumbo, 735 F.2d 1095, 1097 (8th Cir. 1984).
94. United States v. Abdul-Saboor, 85 F.3d 664, 668 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
95. United States v. Myers, 308 F.3d 251, 268–74 (3d Cir. 2002).
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to areas from which the arrestee has been removed.96 If not in such a
circuit, a search will be deemed invalid as beyond Chimel’s scope.97
To make matters worse, search incident to arrest doctrine has
been further muddied as a result of the Court’s 2009 decision in
Arizona v. Gant.98 An auto search case, Gant held that Chimel
“authorizes police to search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant’s
arrest only when the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching
distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search.”99 In
the wake of Gant, the circuits have disagreed over whether the Gant
majority’s more circumscribed view of police authority applies beyond
the auto context, with the Supreme Court failing to resolve the
uncertainty.100
Another illustration of the troubling impact of circuit
disuniformity concerns whether police should be permitted to make
reasonable mistakes as to the scope and meaning of the laws they
invoke when they seize individuals. While historically such mistakes
were uniformly condemned, triggering first tort liability and later
application of the exclusionary rule, based on the finding that any
such seizure was unreasonable for Fourth Amendment purposes,101
recent years have witnessed a weakening of the strict rule. Indeed,
today in the Eighth Circuit102 police are forgiven for their “objectively
reasonable” mistakes of substantive law, a position at direct odds with
every other circuit addressing the issue.103
96. See, e.g., United States v. Currence, 446 F.3d 554, 557 (4th Cir. 2006) (“[O]fficers may
separate the suspect from the item to be searched . . . before they conduct the search.”); AbdulSaboor, 85 F.3d at 670–71 (determining that search of apartment was a lawful search incident to
arrest when the suspect was handcuffed during the search).
97. See, e.g., Myers, 308 F.3d at 267 (invalidating search when arrestee was handcuffed,
lying face down on the floor, and monitored by two police officers); LAFAVE, supra note 83, § 6.3
n.40 (citing Myers and similar cases).
98. 556 U.S. 332 (2009).
99. Id. at 343. The Gant majority also identified an alternate basis to justify a search
incident to arrest, expressly limited (for reasons that remain obscure) to the auto context: when
it is “reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest.” Id. at 346.
100. See Jamie L. Starbuck, Comment, Redefining Searches Incident to Arrest: Gant’s Effect
on Chimel, 116 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1253, 1263 (2012) (“Parties in seventeen different search
incident to arrest cases over time have filed for certiorari; the Supreme Court has denied each
petition.”).
101. Wayne A. Logan, Police Mistakes of Law, 61 EMORY L.J. 69, 70 (2011).
102. E.g., United States v. Martin, 411 F.3d 998, 1001 (8th Cir. 2005).
103. See, e.g., United States v. Coplin, 463 F.3d 96, 101 (1st Cir. 2006) (“Stops premised on a
mistake of law, even a reasonable, good-faith mistake, are generally held to be
unconstitutional.”); United States v. McDonald, 453 F.3d 958, 962 (7th Cir. 2006) ("A stop based
on a subjective belief that a law has been broken, when no violation actually occurred, is not
objectively reasonable.”); United States v. Tibbets, 396 F.3d 1132, 1138 (10th Cir. 2005)
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As a consequence, individuals within the boundaries of the
Eighth Circuit can be detained by police on the mistaken belief that
their behavior is unlawful, and not only will the seizure be condoned,
but any evidence or information secured by police as a result of the
seizure can be used because the exclusionary rule is not at play.104
Thus, police in the Eighth Circuit, as in the other circuits, not only can
make reasonable mistakes of fact, giving rise to probable cause and
reasonable suspicion resulting in a seizure.105 They can also, unlike
police in other circuits, engage in lawless seizures (and hence
searches) with impunity. Affording law enforcement such latitude not
only raises obvious rule of law concerns.106 It also has major practical
implications given the predisposition of modern police to use minor
offenses, often of a highly technical, malum prohibitum nature, as
bases to seize individuals and secure evidence in support of more
serious reasons for prosecution.107
The foregoing examples, just two of the many splits unearthed
here, fail, however, to convey the broader impact of disuniformity.
This is because the interests receiving variable protection are
intended to protect the innocent and guilty alike.108 Because the
exclusionary rule dominates attention and discourse, it is often
overlooked that police authority governs situations when individuals
attracting law enforcement attention are doing nothing whatsoever
wrong.109 Moreover, while it seems unlikely that individuals will often
conduct their lives based on the availability or nonavailability of
Fourth Amendment rights, the possibility exists. For example, ex ante
personal behavior might be affected by a circuit position on the right
(“[F]ailure to understand the law by the very person charged with enforcing it is not objectively
reasonable.”); United States v. Twilley, 222 F.3d 1092, 1096 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[An officer’s] belief
based on a mistaken understanding of the law cannot constitute the reasonable suspicion
required for a constitutional traffic stop.”).
104. See, e.g., Martin, 411 F.3d at 1000–02 (upholding admission of evidence seized as a
result of an auto stop based on officer’s misunderstanding of traffic law).
105. See, e.g., United States v. Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271, 1277 (11th Cir. 2003) (“[A]n
officer’s mistaken assessment of facts need not render his actions unreasonable because what is
reasonable will be completely dependent on the specific and usually unique circumstances
presented by each case.”).
106. See Logan, supra note 101, at 90–95.
107. See Wayne A. Logan, Erie and Federal Criminal Courts, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1243, 1247–
48 (2010) (discussing use of traffic stops to secure evidence in support of more serious
prosecutions).
108. See generally Arnold H. Loewy, The Fourth Amendment as a Device for Protecting the
Innocent, 81 MICH. L. REV . 1229, 1229–31 (1983).
109. A prime example is found in recent data from New York City where the overwhelming
majority of persons stopped, questioned, and frisked by police in 2006 were not ultimately
arrested. See Logan, supra note 101, at 103 n.228.
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of a rental car driver to contest a search; the right of a nonpresent
resident to rely on a prior denial of consent to prevent entry of her
home by police; or the privacy expectation of a prisoner in his mail. 110
In the face of such legal uncertainty, individuals cannot “know the
scope of [their] constitutional protection.”111
In short, whatever the merit of other researchers’ tendency to
dismiss the significance of splits in the civil nonconstitutional
realm,112 the consequences of the doctrinal variation highlighted
here—accounting for what one circuit judge called an “appreciable
entropy among the circuits”113—warrant the opposite conclusion.
2. Persistence
The persistence of Fourth Amendment circuit splits uncovered
here raises additional concern. As noted in Appendix A, while most
splits are of relatively recent vintage, many have endured for years,
with eight splits dating back to the 1990s, and one to the 1980s,114
betraying the Court’s purported preference to act when faced with
“deep splits.”115 The varied circuit positions not only result in
110. For discussion of how Fourth Amendment doctrine can affect the daily life and
behaviors of individuals more generally, see L. Rush Atkinson, The Bilateral Fourth Amendment
and the Duties of Law-Abiding Persons, 99 GEO. L.J. 1517, 1521–26 (2011).
111. See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 459–60 (1981). While such uncertainty is most
acute in instances involving police-citizen interactions at circuit borders, splits also affect
outcomes in other instances, such as when a circuit lacks precedent on an issue. See infra Part
3.A.2.
112. See supra notes 14–15 and accompanying text.
113. United States v. Taylor, 600 F.3d 678, 686 (6th Cir. 2010) (Kethledge, J., dissenting).
114. Again, the conservative methodology used here offers a mere snapshot of extant splits,
excluding, for instance, consideration of splits that did not manifest in the study period. For
example, a split exists over whether police have a per se right to frisk the companion of an
arrestee. See United States v. Bell, 762 F.2d 495, 498 (6th Cir. 1985) (noting disagreement with
United States v. Berryhill, 445 F.2d 1189 (9th Cir. 1971)). While recent decisions such as Arizona
v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323 (2009), emphasize the need for individualized suspicion of a weapon
being present to justify a Terry frisk, the “automatic companion” split continues to be recognized.
E.g., Glantz v. Ren, No. CV 09-149-M-DWM-JCL, 2010 WL 4286234, at *8 n.7 (D. Mont. Sept. 16,
2010). A split also exists on whether one has an expectation of privacy regarding packages
addressed to an alias. United States v. Lozano, 623 F.3d 1055, 1062–64 (9th Cir. 2010)
(O’Scannlain, J., concurring) (citing United States v. Lewis, 738 F.2d 916, 920 (8th Cir. 1984)
(denying expectation) and United States v. Villarreal, 963 F.2d 770, 774 (5th Cir. 1992) (allowing
expectation)).
115. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Workways of the Supreme Court, 25 T. JEFFERSON L. REV.
517, 517 (2003) (“For the most part, the Supreme Court will consider for review only cases
presenting what we call deep splits—questions on which other courts . . . have strongly
disagreed.”); id. at 521 (“[W]e take cases . . . to resolve strong disagreements—splits not likely to
heal . . . . [A]bout 70 percent of the cases we agree to hear involve deep divisions of opinion
among federal courts of appeals or state high courts.”).
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accumulated individual-level differences in search and seizure
outcomes over time.116 They also have negative systemic effects,
including relative to resources, as courts and litigants are required to
address unsettled questions of law.117
With respect to persistence, it should not go unacknowledged
that the Court did see fit to resolve several splits arising during the
study period,118 and agreed to address several others in its October
2011 Term.119 However, as noted earlier and more fully set forth in
Appendix A, multiple splits persist, along with their negative
consequences.
C. The Data in Context
The findings presented here cannot be decoupled from the
broader context in which they arise. Indeed, some degree of variation
can be thought inevitable given the nation’s network of circuit
courts,120 which Judge Posner has aptly characterized as constituting
116. Moreover, the negative impact of the variability is exacerbated by the existence of
multiple circuit positions on particular Fourth Amendment issues. See supra note 82.
117. For a discussion of the costs associated with such uncertainty by a Senior Second
Circuit Judge, see Roger J. Miner, Federal Court Reform Should Start at the Top, 77 JUDICATURE
104, 106–07 (1993) (“Where the Supreme Court has not spoken on an issue, but some circuits
have resolved the question in one way and some in another, litigation is encouraged in those
circuits that have not yet spoken.”); id. at 107 (“Aside from the fact that fairness is lost and
justice is not seen to be done, the lower courts become clogged with cases that would not be
brought if the law was clearly stated.”).
118. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2423–25 (2011) (addressing whether
the “good faith” exception to the exclusionary rule applies to officer reliance on settled case law);
Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 95 (2005) (determining whether police can ask a detainee
questions unrelated to the basis for detention, not resulting in seizure delay); Devenpeck v.
Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 148, 155–56 (2004) (addressing whether, when police arrest on a legally
invalid basis, an alternate legal (yet unarticulated) basis must be “closely related”).
119. See Huff v. City of Burbank, 632 F.3d 539, 548–49 (9th Cir. 2011) (noting and rejecting
position of other circuits that emergency and exigency doctrines for warrantless police entries of
residences are not distinct), cert. granted sub nom. Ryburn v. Huff, 132 S. Ct. 987 (2012); United
States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 556, 563–64 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (noting split on whether attaching
global positioning device to car and tracking it for extended period implicates Fourth
Amendment, and determining that they do), cert. granted sub nom. United States v. Jones, 131
S. Ct. 3064 (2011); Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of Burlington, 621 F.3d 296, 298–99,
311 (3d Cir. 2010) (noting split on permissibility of suspicionless strip searches of minor offense
arrestees and determining that they are permissible), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 1816 (2011). The
Court also agreed to resolve a split in its coming October 2012 Term, dating back to the early
1990s, concerning whether police executing a search warrant can lawfully detain a person
located some distance away from the targeted search premises. See United States v. Bailey, 652
F.3d 197, 204 (2d Cir. 2011) (noting split among five other circuits on the question), cert. granted
Bailey v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2710 (2012).
120. See Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 465 (1990) (noting the “inconsistency . . . which a
multimembered, multi-tiered federal judicial system . . . creates”).
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“at best a loose confederacy.”121 Circuit panels, as noted earlier, need
only decide in a manner ensuring intracircuit jurisprudential
uniformity.122 At the same time, consistent with Supreme Court
license,123 circuit judges do not view creation of a conflict as a
paramount detriment in their decisionmaking124 and as a general
matter act autonomously, not as agents of the Supreme Court relative
to unsettled issues.125
Certainly no less important, the splits must be conceived in
terms of the judicial process from which they emanate and their legal
subject matter. With respect to the former, as Marbury teaches,
judicial interpretation, even of constitutional text, unavoidably affords
some intellectual rein.126 So too does the interpretation of frequently
opaque and open-ended Supreme Court precedent,127 complemented
by the modern Court’s preference for narrower, minimalist holdings.128
The upshot, as political scientist David Klein has found, is that
“[c]ircuit judges are given numerous chances to make law unimpeded
by the Supreme Court, and they seem to take advantage of these
opportunities. . . . [M]uch of the federal law in any circuit looks as it
does because court of appeals judges think it should look that way.”129
121. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS : CHALLENGE AND REFORM 380 (1996).
122. See supra notes 38–39 and accompanying text.
123. See Mast, Foos & Co. v. Stover Mfg. Co., 177 U.S. 485, 488 (1900) (“Comity is not a rule
of law, but one of practice, convenience, and expediency. It is something more than mere courtesy
. . . . But its obligation is not imperative. If it were, the indiscreet action of one court might
become a precedent, increasing in weight with each successive adjudication, until the whole
country was tied down to an unsound principle.”); see also id. (averring that judges should do
what they think is “right”).
124. See DAVID E. KLEIN, MAKING LAW IN THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS 22–25
(2002) (discussing results of circuit judge survey identifying intercircuit uniformity as being of
least importance among several goals in decisionmaking). But see Stephen L. Wasby, Intercircuit
Conflicts in the Courts of Appeals, 63 MONT. L. REV. 119, 123–24, 129 (2002) (concluding, based
on a study of Ninth Circuit case files, that “appellate judges take seriously the charge to reduce
or minimize . . . conflicts before they reach the Supreme Court”).
125. E.g., KLEIN, supra note 124, at 126–27, 134; Frederic M. Bloom, State Courts Unbound,
93 CORNELL L. REV. 501, 512 (2008).
126. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“Those who apply the rule
to particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule.”).
127. See Evan H. Caminiker, Precedent and Prediction: The Forward-Looking Aspects of
Inferior Court Decisionmaking, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1, 10–11 (1994) (“Deciding what a precedent
means will frequently depend on the particular normative values and assumptions each judge
brings to the interpretive enterprise.”).
128. See Jason Mazzone, When the Supreme Court Is Not Supreme, 104 NW. U. L. R EV. 979,
1041–42 (2010) (“The Justices understand that they are setting rules for a diverse nation . . . and
that it is normally better not to decide more than is necessary for the satisfactory disposition of
the case at hand.”). On the purported virtues of the shift, see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A
TIME (2001).
129. KLEIN, supra note 124, at 135.

1b. Logan_Ready for PAGE (Do Not Delete)

1158

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

10/18/2012 8:06 AM

[Vol. 65:5:1337

Fourth Amendment doctrine amply lends itself to such
interstitial judicial lawmaking. The Amendment’s text broadly
proscribes “unreasonable” searches and seizures130 and contains two
clauses that the Supreme Court has long failed to clarify whether and
how are related to one another.131 And even though the Court has
often announced its fealty to “bright-line” Fourth Amendment rules,
the multifarious circumstances of law enforcement make
consistent
rulemaking and application difficult.132
The foregoing observations, however, lack explanatory force
here. The splits documented do not turn on idiosyncratic, often
nonrecurrent particular factual scenarios, such as whether police use
of force was excessive133 or the existence of reasonable suspicion or
probable cause.134 Rather, they reflect basic doctrinal differences
among the circuits on matters concerning the search and seizure
authority of police, applicability of the exclusionary rule, and appellate
standards of review.
At the same time, the splits, in their nature and extent, are
surprising given what we know about the current federal judiciary.
From trial courts up through the Supreme Court, the federal bench is
more conservative than in preceding decades, bearing the
predominant imprint of appointees of Republican Presidents Ronald
Reagan, George H.W. Bush, and George W. Bush.135 Given that
conservatives (at least those of nonlibertarian ilk) have long
disfavored generous readings of the Fourth Amendment and the

130. See Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 139 (1978) (“Because of the necessarily ad hoc
nature of any determination of reasonableness, there can be no inflexible rule of law which will
decide every case.”); cf. Steven L. Winter, Indeterminacy and Incommensurability in
Constitutional Law, 78 CALIF . L. REV. 1441 (1990) (discussing constitutional indeterminacy more
generally).
131. See SALTZBURG & CAPRA, supra note 67, at 32 (noting Court’s varied treatment of the
Amendment’s reasonableness and warrant clauses).
132. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 15 (1968) (acknowledging the “protean variety of the
street encounter”).
133. See, e.g., Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 383 (2007) (recognizing the common need for
courts to “slosh [their] way through the factbound morass of ‘reasonableness’ ” in such claims).
134. See, e.g., United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273–76 (2002) (noting the need for
courts in assessing reasonable suspicion to consider the “totality of the circumstances,” based on
particular facts of situations and officers’ specialized training).
135. See Corey R. Yung, Judged By the Company You Keep: An Empirical Study of the
Ideologies of Judges on the United States Courts of Appeals, 51 B.C. L. REV . 1133, 1181–82
(2010).
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exclusionary rule,136 one would think that the disputes demonstrated
here would not regularly arise.137
At least a partial explanation perhaps lies in the
microcomposition of panels deciding cases. Under current rules, a
three-judge panel in a given circuit, perhaps composed of two or more
civil rights-generous judges138 voting “first in time” can create the law
of the circuit.139 Moreover, given the rarity of en banc
reconsideration,140 even in the acknowledged face of a split,141 such
outcomes can enjoy staying power.142
Whatever the etiology of the splits, we are still left with the
curious failure of the Supreme Court to resolve them. In light of the
increasing conservatism of the Court, which has all but done away
with the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule,143 logic would suggest
136. See Guido Calabresi, The Exclusionary Rule, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL ’Y 111, 111
(2003) (“To conservatives, [the exclusionary rule] is an absurd rule through which manifestly
dangerous criminals are let out because the courts prefer technicalities to truth.”).
137. Indeed, Justice Souter, in seeking to explain the Court’s modest modern-day caseload,
reasoned that the circuits have become more politically homogeneous as a result of presidential
appointments, resulting in fewer splits for the Court to resolve. See Hellman, supra note 63, at
146.
138. See, e.g., Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1171 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he first panel to
consider an issue sets the law not only for all the inferior courts in the circuit, but also future
panels of the court of appeals.”); see also Arthur D. Hellman, “The Law of the Circuit” Revisited:
What Role for Majority Rule?, 32 S. ILL. U. L.J. 625, 625 (2008) (noting that “binding circuit law
can be established by a panel whose views do not represent the views of a majority of the circuit’s
active judges”).
139. As Professor Frank Cross has observed, this is so even though, as a technical matter,
circuits enjoy the power to reverse earlier precedent. See CROSS, supra note 12, at 203–04.
140. See Pauline T. Kim, Deliberation and Strategy on the United States Courts of Appeals:
An Empirical Exploration of Panel Effects, 157 U. PA . L. REV. 1319, 1338 n.71 (2009) (citing
studies showing that the likelihood of a court hearing a case en banc is considerably less than
one percent); see also CROSS, supra note 12, at 108–09 (noting deterrents (including added
decisionmaking burdens) and the negative impact on collegiality associated with reviewing and
reversing one’s colleagues). In addition, it appears that rates of en banc review are even lower in
the criminal litigation context. Amy E. Sloan, The Dog That Didn’t Bark: Stealth Procedures and
the Erosion of Stare Decisis in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 713, 754–55
(2009).
141. While Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 35(b)(1)(B) suggests that a split may
warrant attention in considering a petition for en banc hearing, such hearings do not appear to
occur in significant part due to splits. See Tracey E. George, The Dynamics and Determinants of
the Decision To Grant En Banc Review, 74 WASH. L. REV. 213, 219–20 (1999).
142. See Michael P. Van Alstine, Stare Decisis and Foreign Affairs, 61 DUKE L.J. 941, 1019
(2012) (“[Stare decisis] doctrine is severe indeed. It prohibits reexamination of the first panel’s
precedent even in light of subsequent insights from other circuits.”).
143. See Thomas K. Clancy, The Irrelevancy of the Fourth Amendment in the Roberts Court,
85 CHI .-KENT L. REV. 191, 200–07 (2010) (discussing an array of limits imposed on the
exclusionary rule during the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts); see also Frank Cross et al., A
Positive Political Theory of Rules and Standards, 2012 ILL. L. REV. 1, 37–38 (noting pre-
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that it would eagerly seize opportunities to reexamine and reject any
prodefendant outcomes from inferior courts.144 While in past decades
the Justices perhaps could be expected to resolve splits,145 the results
reported on here make clear that this is not the case today.146 And
when the Court does get around to deciding a contested issue, many
years can pass first, with negative consequences continuing to accrue
in the interim.147
III. QUESTIONING CONFORMITY: NORMATIVE AND PRACTICAL
IMPLICATIONS
Whether circuit-level variation on federal law in general is
problematic has been the subject of lively debate over the years. In
1983, for instance, Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Clifford
appointment memoranda of Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito expressing their desire to
abolish the exclusionary rule).
144. “Aggressive grants,” in political science parlance. H. W. PERRY, JR., DECIDING TO
DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 207–12 (1991); see also
JEFFREY SEGAL & HOWARD SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL
REVISITED 319 (2002) (showing a close association between Justices’ ideologies and their
exclusionary rule votes).
145. See RICHARD F. WOLFSON & PHILIP B. KURLAND, ROBERTSON & KIRKHAM JURISDICTION
OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES § 322 (2d ed. 1951) (“Where the decision of the
Court of Appeals sought to be reviewed by certiorari directly conflicts . . . with the decision of
another Court of Appeals on the same question, the Supreme Court grants certiorari as matter of
course, and irrespective of the importance of the question of law involved.”). But see Robert L.
Stern, Denial of Certiorari Despite a Conflict, 66 HARV. L. REV. 465, 470–72 (1953) (stating that
the Court did not automatically reconcile splits at the time but that one would “usually be
sufficient” for certiorari to be granted).
146. The Court’s institutional inertia, it is important to note, goes unremedied by the Office
of the Solicitor General, an entity theoretically (yet arguably, given its executive branch status)
capable of serving as a superintendent of clarity in national law. See generally Michael W.
McConnell, The Rule of Law and the Role of the Solicitor General, 21 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1105
(1988); David R. Strauss, The Solicitor General and the Interests of the United States, 61 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 165 (1998). As recent work has shown, however, the Office has aligned itself
with the Court’s abstemious preferences and significantly reduced the volume of its certiorari
recommendations, which have enjoyed a historically high rate of success. See Margaret
Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, The Solicitor General’s Changing Role in Supreme
Court Litigation, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1323, 1333–34, 1338–39 (2010); see also Linda R. Cohen &
Matthew L. Spitzer, The Government Litigant Advantage: Implications for the Law, 28 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 391, 395–96 (2000) (arguing that the selectivity of the Office significantly alters the
Court’s plenary docket relative to circuit cases lost by the government). For argument favoring
more zealous advocacy on the part of the Office at the petition stage, see Adam H. Chandler,
Comment, The Solicitor General of the United States: Tenth Justice or Zealous Advocate?, 121
YALE L.J. 725 (2011).
147. See United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 560 (1982) (noting, in an era when the
Court heard many more cases, that “years may pass before the Court finally invalidates a police
practice of dubious constitutionality”).
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Wallace, while noting that “[i]deally” interpretations of federal law
would be uniform, wrote that it was “not clear that there is anything
intrinsically unacceptable about conflicts.”148 “Indeed,” Judge Wallace
continued, “if conflicts were by their very nature unacceptable, the
traditional rule denying precedential status to out-of-circuit decisions
probably would not have enjoyed its long history.”149 More recently,
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Harvie Wilkinson downplayed
the impact of intercircuit conflict, asserting that the “problems of
disuniformity are very much overstated”150 and that the “world will
not end because a few circuit splits are left unresolved.”151 Along these
same lines, Professor Amanda Frost, reflecting on varied circuit court
interpretations of federal civil statutes and regulations, has concluded
that uniformity is often “overvalu[ed]”152 and that disuniformity can
even be beneficial.153
This Part considers whether the foregoing views are warranted
in light of the findings highlighted here regarding federal
constitutional doctrine. Earlier the point was made that on the
“intolerability” measure Fourth Amendment splits have distinct and
more troublesome outcomes than those encountered in the civil,
nonconstitutional law context.154 The splits also “persist,” resulting in
continued disparate outcomes.155 The following discussion examines
the unique difficulties presented by Fourth Amendment splits, first by
situating the study’s findings in the more general debate over whether
splits are problematic, and then by assessing several distinct
normative and practical problems that the splits present.
A. Reasons Traditionally Advanced in Favor of Tolerating Splits
1. Laboratories of Regional Experimentation
Commentators have advanced a variety of arguments in
support of the view that circuit splits are not only unproblematic but
can actually have salutary effect. Perhaps most significant has been
the argument that splits allow for experimentation, providing a
148. J. Clifford Wallace, The Nature and Extent of Intercircuit Conflicts: A Solution Needed
for a Mountain or a Molehill?, 71 CALIF. L. R EV. 913, 923, 929 (1983).
149. Id. at 929.
150. Wilkinson, supra note 14, at 69.
151. Id.
152. Frost, supra note 13, at 1639.
153. Id. at 1571, 1606.
154. See supra Part II.B.1.
155. See supra Part II.B.2.
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benefit akin to that famously envisioned by Justice Brandeis vis-à-vis
state policy preferences.156 According to Judge Wallace, circuit-level
variation permits courts to experiment in ways aligned with the needs
and preferences of their geographic domains. “[T]he very diversity of
our vast country, with its many regional differences and local needs,”
Judge Wallace asserted, “logically supports a flexible system that can
benefit, when appropriate, from federal law which takes account of
these regional variations (e.g., in fields such as water rights).”157 Along
these same lines, political scientist Jennifer Luse and her colleagues
contend that such variations reflect and lend normative significance to
the nation’s federalist structure. The geographical organization of the
circuits is:
[N]o mere artifact of history but reflects the tension between advocates of increased
national power and those who favored devolution of authority to the state and local
level. Although these courts may seek to contribute to uniformity in federal law, “The
task to which the courts of appeals have called themselves is that of making the
national law as applied to their geographic territories.” That is, they attempt to balance
uniformity with necessary regional adaptation, which is reflected (albeit imperfectly) in
the decisions they issue. 158

Whatever their merit more generally, such arguments lack
persuasive force here for several reasons. First and foremost,
constitutional rights differ from the typical subject of Brandeisian
experimentation, the “fields of social and economic science.”159 As the
Court itself has insisted, rights are not the proper subject of
experimentation.160 And even if they were, the modus operandi of the
156. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its
citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without
risk to the rest of the country.”).
157. Wallace, supra note 148, at 930; see also J. WOODFORD HOWARD, JR., COURTS OF
APPEALS IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM: A STUDY OF THE SECOND, FIFTH, AND DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA CIRCUITS 81 (1981) (“[T]he quest for uniformity contains room for regional
experimentation and adaptation of national law to continental diversity.”).
158. Jennifer K. Luse et al., “Such Inferior Courts…”: Compliance by Circuits with
Jurisprudential Regimes, 37 AM . POL. RES. 75, 77–78 (2009) (citation omitted).
159. New State Ice Co., 285 U.S at 310–11 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
160. See, e.g., Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 338 (1921) (“The Constitution was
intended—its very purpose was—to prevent experimentation with the fundamental rights of the
individual.”). A similar view was voiced by Justice Goldberg several decades later:
While I quite agree with Mr. Justice Brandeis that a “State may . . . serve as a
laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments,” I do not believe that this
includes the power to experiment with the fundamental liberties of citizens . . . . I
cannot agree that the Constitution grants such power either to the States or to the
Federal Government.
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (citations omitted);
see also Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 312 n.5 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
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experimentation differs from the Brandeisian model. With the latter,
the effects of policy choices are cabined to single states;161 circuit
positions, on the other hand, by definition influence rights across
several states, affecting far more individuals.162
It is also difficult to imagine any attendant sorting benefit,
championed by devolutionary federalism proponents more generally,
who posit based on Charles Tiebout’s influential thesis163 that citizens
will “vote with their feet” and allow identification of optimal policy.164
Even assuming, as Tiebout did relative to local public goods, that
individuals are fully informed of variant policies,165 Fourth
Amendment rights are ill-suited to the analysis. It is highly unlikely
that a circuit’s position on a particular Fourth Amendment question,
whether restrictive or generous, would drive the major life-affecting
decision to move, even among the most law-and-order or civil libertyoriented individuals.166 Exit likelihood, moreover, is further
diminished given that U.S. mobility is overwhelmingly intrastate in
(“Communities vary . . . in many respects . . . and such variances have never been considered to
require or justify a varying standard for application of the Federal Constitution . . . . It is, after
all, a national Constitution we are expounding.” (citations omitted)).
161. See New State Ice Co., 285 U.S. at 311 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (lauding “experiments”
undertaken “without risk to the rest of the country”). At the same time, serious question remains
over whether varied state policies and practices actually function as anything like experiments.
See Michael Abramowicz et al., Randomizing Law, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 929, 947 (2011) (“The
difficulties that social scientists and especially policymakers face in assessing the results of state
innovations contribute to the inaptness of the states-as-laboratories metaphor.”); Edward L.
Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903,
923–26 (1994) (questioning whether states can actually serve as laboratories of
experimentation).
162. Circuit precedent can also affect outcomes in unexpected contexts. For instance, the
Board of Immigration Appeals generally applies the law of the circuit in which a case arises. See
Irene Scharf, The Exclusionary Rule in Immigration Proceedings: Where It Was, Where It Is,
Where It May Be Going, 12 SAN DIEGO INT ’L L.J. 53, 86 (2010). In state courts, federal rights
claims can be controlled or at least influenced by the law of the circuit in which they are located.
See Amanda Frost & Stefanie A. Lindquist, Countering the Majoritarian Difficulty, 96 VA. L.
REV. 719, 761 (2010). Finally, as discussed later, the practical effect of a circuit adopting a
position can extend well beyond that circuit, affecting rights of individuals who find themselves
criminally prosecuted in another circuit. See infra Part III.B.2.
163. See generally Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL.
ECON. 416, 416 (1956) (discussing a model that “yields a solution for the level of expenditures for
local public goods which reflects the preferences of the population more adequately than they can
be reflected at the national level”).
164. See generally ROBERT D. COOTER, THE S TRATEGIC CONSTITUTION 127–29 (2000). On
exit more generally, see ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO
DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS , AND STATES 21–29 (1970).
165. Tiebout, supra note 163, at 419.
166. For examples of the expansive literature critiquing Tiebout’s model on similar grounds,
see, for example, Vicki Been, “Exit” as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the
Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 473, 515–17 (1991).
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nature.167 One would need to change state residence and perhaps even
cross several states’ boundaries to satisfy a doctrinal preference.168
Furthermore, there is reason to question whether the varied
Fourth Amendment positions noted here reflect distinct geographic
preferences worthy of deference. Most obvious, purported geographic
representativeness is significantly undercut by the common
occurrence of judges (whether trial or appellate) from other circuits
sitting by designation on three-judge panels with precedential
authority.169 Moreover, while something might be said in favor of the
geographic voice of federal trial courts,170 many circuits can scarcely
be characterized as region based. For example, the Sixth Circuit
contains states from the upper Midwest (Michigan) and the South
(Tennessee); the First Circuit contains New England states
(Massachusetts and Maine) and Puerto Rico. And, even if circuits were
comprised of more cohesive sociocultural regions, it is not clear that
they would manifest distinctiveness, given the nation’s ongoing
homogenization.171 Indeed, to the extent geographic differences exist,
they would most likely be evident at the more granular level of urban
versus rural jurisdictions, a distinction operative in all circuits.
Findings of political scientists on the federal appellate process
itself further undercut the premise of regionalism. A rich literature
exists on factors found to influence judicial decisionmaking—including
ideology,172 legal formalism,173 strategic institutional goals (e.g., career
167. See Todd E. Pettys, The Mobility Paradox, 92 GEO. L.J. 481, 489–90 (2004).
168. Id. at 502 (noting personal factors militating against interstate moves and commenting
that “our lives are too multi-dimensional to suppose that our regulatory preferences always will
play a decisive role”); Mark D. Rosen, The Surprisingly Strong Case for Tailoring Constitutional
Principles, 153 U. PA. L. REV . 1513, 1606–07 (2005) (discussing why smaller polities have smaller
exit costs). That Fourth Amendment rights might be thought to disproportionately affect the
poor, lacking in relative mobility wherewithal yet the common focus of street-level policing,
further undercuts reason to think that foot-voting will be operative. See Richard Briffault, Our
Localism: Part II—Localism and Legal Theory, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 346, 420–21 (1990) (noting
that mobility “is constrained by a variety of economic factors that tend to affect poorer people
more than affluent ones”).
169. See Daniel J. Meador, A Challenge to the Judicial Architecture: Modifying the Regional
Design of the U.S. Courts of Appeal, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 603, 605 (1989) (“In the [Courts of
Appeals], there are numerous judges sitting in constantly shifting panels of three to which cases
are routed on a random basis. The active judges in each circuit are frequently joined by senior
judges, visiting judges from other circuits, and district judges sitting by designation . . . .”).
170. See Carl Tobias, Sixth Circuit Federal Judicial Selection, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 721,
726 (2003) (discussing the likelihood that federal trial judges have greater familiarity with local
norms and practice).
171. See Rubin & Feeley, supra note 161, at 944–45 (disputing premise of state and regional
heterogeneity and asserting that “the United States has one political community, and that
political community is the United States”).
172. See, e.g., SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 144.
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advancement),174 and party affiliation. Focusing on the latter, Donald
Songer and his coauthors found that “[a]lthough the courts of appeals
may have originally been conceived as regional appellate courts, they
have evolved into a modern-day institution staffed by men and women
whose decisions are frequently shaped by policy views that mirror the
beliefs of the president responsible for their appointment.”175 If
anything accounts for circuit judicial orientation, it is the
concentration of liberals and conservatives in a circuit (based on the
number of appointments available to a President),176 and related
“panel effects” (outcomes affected by the preponderance of like-minded
judges on given three-judge panels),177 not the effects of region.178
Finally, the model fails because circuits are not like states,
whose sovereign “dignity” is thought worthy of respect.179 Circuit court
decisions are rendered by life-tenured Article III judges, not
subfederal democratic polities deserving of deference.180 Indeed,
173. See, e.g., Harry T. Edwards, The Effects of Collegiality on Judicial Decision Making,
151 U. PA. L. REV. 1639, 1656 (2003).
174. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 29–31 (2008).
175. DONALD R. SONGER ET AL., CONTINUITY AND CHANGE ON THE UNITED STATES COURTS
OF APPEALS 143 (2000); see also id. at 142 (finding “greater variation among circuits within
regions than between circuits from different regions” and stating that “in issue areas where we
found virtually no variation among regions in a particular time period, we found substantial
variation among circuits during the same time period”).
176. See Yung, supra note 135, at 1162–63.
177. On “panel effects” more generally, see Kim, supra note 140.
178. Yung, supra note 135, at 1183–85.
179. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 714 (1999); see also Frank Cross, The Folly of
Federalism, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 18–19 (2002) (noting common emphasis on state sovereignty
in federalism discourse).
180. See, e.g., Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of
Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215, 222 (2000) (observing that federalism is “meant to preserve
the regulatory authority of state and local institutions to legislate policy choices”). By the same
token, the varied Fourth Amendment doctrinal tapestry resulting from circuit splits lacks the
justification operative in the First Amendment-obscenity context, a notable exception to the
general aversion for localization of constitutional rights. See Mark D. Rosen, The Radical
Possibility of Limited Community-Based Interpretation of the Constitution, 43 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 927, 995 (2002) (discussing community standards doctrine). Under Miller v. California, 413
U.S. 15 (1973), obscenity determinations are fact-based, case-by-case determinations often made
by juries and based on local standards. See id. at 30. The Fourth Amendment doctrinal decisions
at issue here, by contrast, are made by Article III judges alone and serve as governing rules for
entire circuits. The contexts also vary in the terms of their applicable scope. With obscenity,
those facing the risk of rights limitation (self-censorship), typically commercial creators and
distributors of potentially obscene materials (possession in the home of obscene materials is
protected by Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969)), can mitigate their risk by keeping
materials away from a less tolerant jurisdiction. With Fourth Amendment rights, the populace at
large—itself not likely attuned to the rule particularities at play—faces a variable-rights regime,
with unequal deprivations of physical liberty and privacy in the balance. Finally, even with
obscenity, a shift is now seemingly taking place in favor of a national standard, owing to the
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perversely, state interests can actually be undermined by circuit court
decisions. Such is the case, for instance, when a criminal prosecution,
susceptible of being initiated in state or federal court, “goes federal.”
In such a situation, if a circuit embraces a more restrictive position on
a Fourth Amendment issue, that position prevails, regardless of
whether a state court, interpreting its own constitution, would extend
a more expansive right.181
2. Percolation
A related yet distinct argument advanced in the debate over
splits is that varied circuit positions on contested matters should be
left to develop and percolate for a period of time. On this view, delay
not only comports with institutional interests associated with
Bickelsian “passive virtues,”182 but can also result in superior
Supreme Court outcomes,183 including on constitutional questions.
Indeed, according to Professor Dan Meador, percolation is especially
welcome with federal constitutional law:
[Percolation] has its greatest force in relation to constitutional questions. The Supreme
Court’s decision on the meaning of a constitutional provision is difficult, if not virtually
impossible as a practical matter, to change; it can only be changed through the
cumbersome [amendment process]. Thus it is important that the Supreme Court have

Internet. See Clay Calvert, The End of Forum Shopping in Internet Obscenity Cases? The
Ramifications of the Ninth Circuit’s Groundbreaking Understanding of Community Standards in
Cyberspace, 89 NEB. L. REV. 47, 73–79 (2010).
181. See generally William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of
Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977). Moreover, as earlier noted, a circuit position can
influence state court interpretations of federal constitutional law in state court litigation. See
supra note 162.
182. See Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court, 1960 Term, Foreword: The Passive
Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV . 40 (1961) (asserting that a key feature of the Court’s perceived
legitimacy is its prudential restraint in deciding when to address an issue).
183. See SAMUEL ESTREICHER & JOHN SEXTON, REDEFINING THE SUPREME COURT’S ROLE 48
(1986) (“The Supreme Court, when it decides a fully percolated issue, thus has the benefit of the
experience of those lower courts, often yielding concrete information about how a particular rule
will ‘write,’ its capacity for dealing with varying fact patterns, and the merits of alternate
approaches.”); Charles L. Black, Jr., The National Court of Appeals: An Unwise Proposal, 83
YALE L.J. 883, 898 (1974) (“[Splits] can be endured and sometimes ought to be endured while
judges and scholars observe the respective workings out in practice of the conflicting rules,
particularly where the question of law is a close one, to which confident answer will in any case
be impossible.”); Richard Revesz, Specialized Courts and the Administrative Lawmaking System,
138 U. PA. L. REV. 1111, 1155 (1990) (“Intercircuit dialogue not only benefits the quality of
adjudication by the courts of appeals, but also aids the Supreme Court’s adjudication of cases
involving conflicts among the circuits.”); Wallace, supra note 148, at 927 n.66 (“[I]ntercircuit
conflicts add to the quality of federal justice by providing differing perspectives on the law to the
Supreme Court, which therefore can make clearer and better reasoned judgments.”).
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the benefit of as much thinking on the question as is feasible before it makes this final
resolution. 184

The arguments in favor of percolation, however, fail to
persuade for several reasons. First, despite occasional Court mention
of its benefits,185 scant evidence of percolation actually exists. To test
the percolation thesis, all Fourth Amendment-related cases decided by
the Court from its 1981 through 2010 Terms were examined.186 The
effort yielded several interesting results.
Perhaps most notably, federal circuit splits explicitly figured in
only a few opinions during the thirty-year study period. While
analysis of the Court’s certiorari process is notoriously difficult given
the lack of any requirement that the Court specify why a petition is
granted or denied,187 evidence of circuit influence conceivably lies in
the actual content of the Court’s opinions. Of the 138 Fourth
Amendment merits opinions from the period, in only seventeen (in a
majority, dissent, or concurrence) was there express acknowledgment
of the existence of a federal circuit split. This paucity, while of course
not definitive evidence of the low materiality of splits,188 at least calls
into question their salient value and importance.
More damning of percolation, however, is the lack of evident
utility of splits when they are actually mentioned. Typically, when the

184. Meador, supra note 169, at 633. Justice Ginsburg and Peter Huber offered this
analysis:
Under the grandly general mandates of the Bill of Rights . . . judges quite properly
build the law through a process of accretion, erosion, and correction. This dynamic,
too, operates in both space and time. The common law is forged in fifty states and in
thirteen federal circuits. Variability in such areas of the law, both geographic and
temporal, is not only permissible; it is what gives the law contemporary coherence and
vitality. Variability in the interpretation of minutely particular federal statutes is
another matter.
Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Peter W. Huber, The Intercircuit Committee, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1417,
1425 (1987).
185. See, e.g., E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112, 135 n.26 (1977)
(positing “the wisdom of allowing difficult issues to mature through full consideration by the
courts of appeals”).
186. The cases were collected and reviewed on the basis of a search of the HeinOnline
database, containing digitized versions of U.S. Reports decisions.
187. Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, The Philosophy of Certiorari:
Jurisprudential Considerations in Supreme Court Case Selection, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 389, 402
(2004).
188. See Hellman, supra note 63, at 149 (“Whether the Court refers to a conflict—or gives
any reason for hearing the case—may depend on how the opinion is written and which Justice
writes it.”); Eric Hansford, Note, Measuring the Effects of Specialization with Circuit Split
Resolutions, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1145, 1162 n.90 (2011) (“[T]he Justices may have incentives to
present a split in a certain light, or inclinations toward not including the full split (or not
including the split at all).”).
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Court does acknowledge a split, it merely notes its existence, usually
but not always adverting to its role as a certiorari catalyst.189 In other
instances, the Court merely describes how the circuits line up on an
issue, and mentions the need to clarify the constitutionality of the
matter in question.190
In lieu of analyzing the merits of respective circuit positions,
the Court usually bases its jurisprudential outcomes on prior decisions
or opinions of individual Justices. United States v. Hensley, which
resolved a circuit split on whether police can stop an individual based
on reasonable suspicion of committing a past (as opposed to
transpiring) felony,191 represents perhaps the best example of circuit
percolation.192 Yet even there the Court merely articulated the
position of the Ninth Circuit, with which it ultimately agreed, without
significant analysis.193 More representative is the duo of landmark
cases of the early 1980s concerning the “good faith” exception to the
exclusionary rule. Despite extensive briefing by the parties on the
divergence of opinion on the doctrinally rich question,194 the Court’s
chief decision in United States v. Leon failed to even acknowledge the

189. See, e.g., Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 695, 695 n.4 (1996) (noting circuit split
and stating that certiorari was granted to resolve the conflict); United States v. Padilla, 508 U.S.
77, 81, 81 n.3 (1993) (same); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 522, 522 n.5 (1984) (noting split in
a footnote without mention that the split motivated grant of certiorari).
190. See, e.g., Immigration & Nationalization Serv. v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 215 (1984)
(stating that certiorari was granted because of split and because issue “has serious implications
for the enforcement of immigration laws”); United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 112–13
(1984) (stating that certiorari was granted because of split and “because [drug] field tests play an
important role in the enforcement of the narcotics laws”).
191. 469 U.S. 221, 225–26 (1985). Hensley, it warrants mention, did not address the
question of whether a stop can be based on an officer’s belief that the detainee committed a past
misdemeanor, an issue on which a split now exists. See United States v. Grigg, 498 F.3d 1070,
1076 n.4, 1081 (9th Cir. 2007) (adopting position in conflict with Gaddis v. Redford, 364 F.3d 763
(6th Cir. 2007), on whether a stop can be based on suspicion of a completed misdemeanor).
192. Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849 (2011), not part of this study because it reviewed an
opinion by the Kentucky Supreme Court, provides perhaps the optimal example of the idealized
percolation process more generally. In King, the Court methodically identified and evaluated
various approaches taken by state and federal courts on when police, faced with possible
destruction of evidence, impermissibly “create” such an exigency, invalidating entry of a home
without a search warrant. See id. at 1858–60.
193. See Hensley, 469 U.S. at 231–32 (citing United States v. Robinson, 536 F.2d 1298, 1300
(9th Cir. 1976)). The Court disavowed the contrary position of the Sixth Circuit, see Hensley v.
United States, 713 F.2d 220, 225 (6th Cir. 1983), with no explicit mention of the existence of a
circuit split.
194. See, e.g., Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Massachusetts v. Shepherd, 468 U.S. 981
(1984) (No. 82-963), 1982 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 97.
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split, instead relying on its own teachings and the views of
commentators.195
Again, the absence of overt critical examination of competing
circuit positions does not conclusively prove that circuit splits lack
influence on the Court’s substantive decisionmaking. It could certainly
be the case that a once-contested issue, having been fully “percolated,”
presents an easier case for the Court to resolve. Nevertheless, the
failure to identify splits and articulate their intellectual
underpinnings at a minimum undermines the posited informed
deliberateness associated with percolation and justifies long-held
skepticism regarding the theory among scholars196 and judges.197
Yet, even if the empirical record were more persuasive, strong
reason exists to reject the percolation rationale. Constitutional rights,
as noted earlier, are not the proper subject of experimentation.198
195. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922–26 (1983). Yet another example arose in the
October 2011 Term when the Court, while presumably granting certiorari to address a split
acknowledged by the Ninth Circuit and the parties, issued a brief per curiam opi nion granting
certiorari and containing no reference whatsoever to the split. See Ryburn v. Huff, 132 S. Ct. 987,
990–92 (2012) (implicitly declining to distinguish exigency and emergency exceptions to the
warrant requirement, and failing to directly address whether the exigency exception also
requires probable cause of wrongdoing inside residence), rev’g Huff v. City of Burbank, 632 F.3d
539, 548 n.3 (9th Cir. 2011) (rejecting the position of the Sixth and Tenth Circuits merging the
two exceptions, not requiring “both probable cause and exigent circumstances, including safety,
for a warrantless entry into the home”).
196. See, e.g., Caminiker, supra note 127, at 57 (“I doubt that the strength of an inferior
court’s conviction that a particular interpretation provides the best reading will—or should—
influence the Supreme Court’s independent judgment. It is difficult to see what expertise the
inferior court might bring to the problem that would outweigh the general presumption of
greater proficiency in the Supreme Court.”); cf. Todd J. Tiberi, Supreme Court Denials of
Certiorari in Conflicts Cases: Percolation or Procrastination?, 54 U. PITT. L. REV. 861, 879–81,
889 (1993) (finding that, of thirty-six “percolated” decisions concerning splits on statutory
meaning, the Court cited lower courts for propositions important to its holding in only thirteen
cases, and that delay in resolving conflicts did not improve the quality of decisions rendered,
based on several measures). But see Pamela C. Corley et al., Lower Court Influence on U.S.
Supreme Court Opinion Content, 73 J. POL. 31, 37 (2011) (using plagiarism software to discern
common overlap between language in court of appeals opinions and Supreme Court majority
opinions, but failing to differentiate instances of factual recitations or “arguments relating to the
substance of the legal questions facing the courts”).
197. Second Circuit Judge Henry Friendly, for example, offered the following view:
If a case involves questions of federal law of such importance to be reviewed by the
Supreme Court, the views of the courts of appeals count, and should count, for little. I
am unable to share the view, expressed on occasion by some polite Justices and
entertained by some of my colleagues, that we have much to contribute in such cases;
I doubt whether many of the Justices even read our opinions, at least on
constitutional issues, except as these are filtered through the briefs of counsel or the
memoranda of law clerks.
Henry J. Friendly, Second Circuit Note, 1970 Term, 46 ST. JOHN’S L. R EV. 406, 407 (1972).
198. See supra notes 160–62 and accompanying text; see also Thomas E. Baker & Douglas E.
McFarland, The Need for a New National Supreme Court, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1400, 1408 (1987)
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Disputes over the nature and reach of rights present basic normative
questions for judicial resolution, and delay simply allows for their
continued unequal distribution.199 As Chief Justice Rehnquist
recognized twenty-five years ago:
[T]o . . . suggest that it is actually desirable to allow important questions of federal law
to ‘percolate’’ in the lower courts for a few years before the Supreme Court takes them
on seems to me a very strange suggestion. . . . We are not engaged in a scientific
experiment or in an effort to square the circle . . . [T]here is no obviously ‘correct’
solution. . . . What we need is not the ‘correct’ answer in the philosophical or
mathematical sense, but the ‘definitive’ answer, and the definitive answer can be given
under our system only by the court of last resort. It is of little solace to the litigant who
lost years ago in a court of appeals decision to learn that his case was part of the
‘percolation’ process which ultimately allowed the Supreme Court to vindicate his
position. 200

Finally, to the extent benefit accrues, it reaches a point of
diminishing returns once the diverse position(s) materialize.201 Splits
do not necessarily disappear as a result of the “patient resolution of
the conflict” within circuits, as Judge Wallace asserted.202 Rather, “law
of the circuit” doctrine ensures the continued vitality of splits, which
persist when the Supreme Court fails to intercede. Nor is delay
justified because it affords another government branch an opportunity
to act, as is the case with splits over the meaning or reach of a federal
statute. Again, the constitutional conflicts at issue here can be
definitively resolved only by the nation’s “one supreme Court,”203
which “is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution.”204
(“We cannot accept the underlying logic behind percolation—the notion that somehow a better
reasoned Supreme Court decision will result from subjecting citizens in different parts of the
country to differing interpretations of the same national law, either constitutional or statutory.”);
Caminiker, supra note 127, at 59 (stating that circuit splits are not “real-world experiments that
can help the Supreme Court Justices determine the workability and desirability of various legal
rules governing a particular issue”).
199. See Walter V. Schaefer, Reducing Circuit Conflicts, 69 A.B.A. J. 452, 454 (1983)
(“[N]owhere does the Constitution give the Supreme Court the authority to experiment with the
legal rights of citizens. The common denominator of these rationalizations is a kind of
institutional myopia that focuses on abstractions and ignores the impact of the law on real
people.”).
200. William H. Rehnquist, The Changing Role of the Supreme Court, 14 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
1, 11 (1986).
201. See Thompson, supra note 48, at 469 (“After a few circuits have had some time to
explore an issue, the costs of conflict will soon outweigh the marginal value of further
experimentation.”); see also Walter V. Schaefer, Reliance on the Law of the Circuit—A Requiem,
1985 DUKE L.J. 690, 690, 690 n.2 (asserting that percolation theory merely accords a “false
legitimacy” for the Supreme Court’s “deferring decisions on difficult issues”).
202. Wallace, supra note 148, at 931.
203. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
204. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 616 n.7 (2000) (quoting Miller v. Johnson, 515
U.S. 900, 922–23 (1995)); see also William J. Brennan, Jr., The National Court of Appeals:
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Thus, contrary to the contention of Professor Meador,205 it is precisely
in the realm of federal constitutional law, not statutory law, that
percolation (and delay) is most problematic.
B. Concerns
In addition to lacking discernible instrumental benefit, the
splits highlighted here have an array of broader negative effects, of
both a theoretical and practical nature.
1. National Constitutional Culture
Americans, as manifest in the “We the People” prefacing their
Constitution,206 have long been tied by a sense of shared constitutional
norms.207 The question thus naturally arises whether varied circuit
positions on Fourth Amendment rights are problematic because they
undermine an important sense of shared constitutionalism.
Before answering, it should not go unacknowledged that
history provides no ironclad evidence of preordained constitutional
consistency. The Framers failed to insert in Article III any
requirement of uniformity208 and a similar omission marked
subsequent congressional creation of the lower federal courts.209
However, such observations qualify only as starting points. They not
only neglect powerful Founding Era counterevidence favoring
decisional
uniformity—including
the
Supremacy
Clause,210
designation of “one supreme Court” dedicated to ultimate resolution of
federal law,211 and the circuit riding of the Court’s Justices.212 They

Another Dissent, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 473, 482 (1973) (identifying Court’s role in part as being “to
define the rights guaranteed by the Constitution”); Gerald Gunther, Congressional Power to
Curtail Federal Court Jurisdiction: An Opinionated Guide to the Ongoing Debate, 36 STAN. L.
REV. 895, 911 (1984) (recognizing the need for an “ultimately authoritative court at the apex of
the judicial hierarchy”).
205. See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
206. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
207. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
208. See Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article III: Separating the Two Tiers of
Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REV. 205, 209 (1985); Amy Coney Barrett, The Supervisory
Power of the Supreme Court, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 324, 356 (2006).
209. Amar, supra note 208, at 208.
210. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (stating that the “Judges in every State shall be bound” by
the “Constitution, and the Laws of the United States”).
211. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
212. See Barry Friedman, Under the Law of Federal Jurisdiction: Allocating Cases Between
Federal and State Courts, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1211, 1218 (2004).
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also ignore the nation’s critically important post-Framing Era
experience.
Notably, federal criminal appeals were not even allowed until
1879,213 and constitutional law came to figure significantly in national
life only after the Civil War.214 The Fourth Amendment itself was
scarcely mentioned by the Court until 1886,215 and significant
litigation over its interpretation did not come until several decades
later.216 One can also point to an array of other developments
occurring over time that evidence the broader institutional desire for
uniformity. Included in this list would be adoption of Supreme Court
Rule 10 (specifying circuit conflict as a reason to grant certiorari)217
and the creation of specialized subject-matter courts such as the
Federal Circuit.218
Nor does it suffice to assert that disuniformity is somehow
justified by federalist tradition. It is one thing to allow courts of
sovereign states to interpret their own constitutions, and even to
interpret rights contained in the Federal Constitution, subject to U.S.
Supreme Court review.219 It is yet another to permit the courts of a
single sovereign—the U.S. Government—to variously interpret and
apply that sovereign’s law,220 creating what has rightfully been called
a federal “judicial Tower of Babel.”221 Doing so allows the rule of law—
and not that concerning just any subtype, but rather that concerning
213. SURRENCY, supra note 30, at 312. Until then, only in instances of certification—when a
circuit court was divided on a legal question and sought Supreme Court guidance—and habeas
corpus proceedings did the Court review criminal cases. Id. at 310–11.
214. See Wayne A. Logan, Contingent Constitutionalism: State and Local Criminal Laws
and the Applicability of Federal Constitutional Rights, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 143, 170 (2009)
(discussing nationalizing effect of Fourteenth Amendment in particular).
215. See CLANCY, supra note 16, § 2.4, at 42 (noting same and citing Boyd v. United States,
116 U.S. 616 (1886)).
216. See Jerold H. Israel, Selective Incorporation Revisited, 71 GEO. L.J. 253, 253 (1982)
(discussing history of selective incorporation); see also David M. O’Brien, Managing the Business
of the Supreme Court, 45 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 667, 669 (1985) (noting a marked increase in the
filing of federal constitutional criminal procedure claims in the post–World War II period).
217. See supra note 20.
218. See Dragich, supra note 13, at 545–46 (noting the same and identifying other factors
suggesting a structural desire for decisional uniformity).
219. See generally MICHAEL E. SOLIMINE & JAMES L. WALKER, RESPECTING STATE COURTS:
THE INEVITABILITY OF JUDICIAL FEDERALISM 87–104 (1999).
220. Sandra Day O’Connor, Our Judicial Federalism, 35 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1, 4 (1984)
(“[A] single sovereign’s laws should be applied equally to all . . . .”).
221. Meador, supra note 169, at 640 (condemning a “judicial Tower of Babel produced by an
appellate system with overreliance on regionally organized courts with ever growing numbers of
judges deciding an ever swelling number of cases, through constantly shifting three-judge panels
with randomly assigned dockets, subject only to the remote possibility of Supreme Court
review”).
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constitutional rights ostensibly applicable nationwide—to vary in
accord with the inclinations of intermediate-level judicial tribunals.222
Allowing such variation is a recipe for public disillusionment
over the authoritativeness of national institutions. The federal bench
enjoys a “franchise” on federal questions223 based on its posited
expertise and experience,224 which federal horizontal inconsistency
undermines.225 As Dean Caminiker recognized:
[U]niform interpretation of federal law helps to secure popular respect for judicial
authority. Federal courts depend on the perceived legitimacy of their enterprise for their
authority over other government actors and the general public. This perception rests, in
turn, on widespread acceptance and appreciation of the courts’ work product; perceived
legitimacy endures so long as the judiciary is seen as laboring to ground its decisions in
legal principle. Uniform interpretation of federal law throughout the land helps preserve
this perception. 226

Ultimately, such a legitimacy deficit risks corrosion of respect
for the Supreme Court itself. The Court’s failure to settle conflicts—by
its own admission often due to its failure to offer guidance227—when it

222. See id. (“One of the most basic features of law is that it embodies a set of rules and
principles applicable to everyone in like manner throughout the jurisdiction it purports to
govern. A judicial system that produces legal doctrine differing because of the happenstance of
the place of litigation and of the particular judges sitting on the case is hostile to the reign of
law.”); see also Frank B. Cross, Shattering the Fragile Case for Judicial Review of Rulemaking,
85 VA. L. REV . 1243, 1249 (1999) (“A central feature of the rule of law is its horizontal consistency
of application.”); id. at 1253 (“In addition to undermining the substance of the rule of law, circuit
splits also undermine respect for the rule of law.”).
223. See Gil Seinfeld, The Federal Courts as a Franchise: Rethinking the Justifications for
Federal Question Jurisdiction, 97 CALIF . L. REV. 95, 97 (2009) (“[F]ederal courts are thought
better able than state courts to supply uniform application of federal law . . . .”); see also Erwin
Chemerinsky & Larry Kramer, Defining the Role of the Federal Courts, 1990 BYU L. REV. 67, 85
(suggesting that the “availability of a federal forum significantly advances th[e] goal” of uniform
interpretation of federal law).
224. Seinfeld, supra note 223, at 109.
225. See Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 312 (2005)
(stating that federal question jurisdiction promotes uniform interpretation of federal law); ERWIN
CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 5.2.1, at 272 (5th ed. 2007) (“Another frequently offered
justification for federal question jurisdiction is the need to ensure uniformity in the
interpretation of federal law.”).
226. Caminiker, supra note 127, at 40; see also id.:
If federal law means X in the First Circuit and Y in the Second Circuit, then the
public might presume that one or both circuit courts are (1) unprincipled in their
interpretive process, (2) in error due to their incompetence, or (3) in error due to the
indeterminate nature of legal reasoning. Each of these alternatives subverts the
courts’ efforts to be seen as oracles of exogenous, objective, and determinant legal
principles.
227. See Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 76 (2006) (recognizing that lower court conflicts
“reflect[] [a] lack of guidance from th[e] Court”); see also Penny J. White, Relinquished
Responsibilities, 123 HARV. L. REV. 120, 134 (2009) (noting that “it is almost commonplace for the
Court to issue holdings that raise as many questions as are answered”).
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has docket capacity to do so228 undercuts public faith in the Court’s
institutional legitimacy as the nation’s ultimate arbiter of
constitutional law.229
Importantly, moreover, the Court’s failure to mediate circuit
conflicts produces a different kind of deficit—one concerning
constitutional norms. When the Court fails to resolve uncertainties
such as those discussed here, it fails at something more than its
“constitutional housekeeping” mission (as when one provision properly
might be formalistically favored over another in rationalizing an
outcome).230 Rather, it abdicates its core responsibility to clarify the
meaning of a right,231 implicitly signaling to the public at large that it
is not sufficiently important to warrant the Court’s attention.232
While problematic in general, the failure raises particular
concern given the judiciary’s increasing latitude to avoid articulation
of constitutional norms. This is especially apparent in civil rights
litigation regarding qualified immunity, where Fourth Amendment
claims are commonly raised. After Pearson v. Callahan,233 courts can
avoid deciding whether a particular Fourth Amendment right was
violated by police and can resolve a claim solely on the basis of
whether the right was “clearly established.”234 Fourth Amendment

228. See Ryan J. Owens & Donald A. Simon, Explaining the Supreme Court’s Shrinking
Docket, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1219, 1260 (2012) (suggesting that the Court’s shrinking docket
might engender public belief that the Court “does not work sufficiently hard or is not sufficiently
fair, and, thereby, diminish the Court’s legitimacy”).
229. Suffice it to say, while to some degree unavoidable given the hierarchal nature of the
federal system, the situation presents a zero-sum risk scenario. As Professor Robert Mikos
helpfully pointed out to me in conversation, the Court’s repudiation of a circuit’s position on a
question could diminish popular respect for that court.
230. See Barry Friedman & Daniel Deacon, A Course Unbroken: The Constitutional
Legitimacy of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 97 VA. L. REV. 1877, 1937 (2011) (discussing
ongoing disagreement over textual source of dormant commerce clause doctrine despite its
undisputed historic functional role).
231. See FED. JUDICIAL CTR., REPORT OF THE STUDY GROUP ON THE CASELOAD OF THE
SUPREME COURT (1972), reprinted in 57 F.R.D. 573, 578 (1973) (describing the core roles of
Supreme Court as being “to define and vindicate rights guaranteed by the Constitution, to assure
the uniformity of federal law, and to maintain the constitutional distribution of powers in our
federal union”).
232. See Brennan, supra note 204, at 483 (“The choice of issues for decision largely
determines the image that the American people have of their Supreme Court.”); Cordray &
Cordray, supra note 187, at 452 (noting that the Court’s docket selection “decisions about what to
decide, and what not to decide, can raise or depress the salience of issues throughout American
politics and society”).
233. 555 U.S. 223 (2009).
234. See generally Jack M. Beerman, Qualified Immunity and Constitutional Avoidance,
2009 SUP. CT . REV. 139. Indeed, such was the case in Pearson itself, regarding the “consent once
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norms, moreover, often go underdeveloped as a result of other factors.
For instance, courts regularly avoid specifying police search and
seizure wrongs by invoking exceptions to the exclusionary rule
(particularly inevitable discovery and officer “good faith”),235 and
federal courts have long lacked the opportunity to unify federal
doctrine due to an absence of habeas authority over state prisoner
Fourth Amendment claims.236
2. Practical Ramifications
In addition to the foregoing normative concerns, the circuit
splits uncovered here have a variety of subtle yet noteworthy practical
ramifications.
a. “Intercircuit” Cases
As an initial matter, varied circuit positions can have impact
well beyond circuits’ geographic borders. One context in which this
occurs is when a motion to suppress is filed in one circuit, based on
charges pending there, which challenges the use of evidence or
information secured by state, local, or federal law enforcement in
another circuit. As one federal trial court framed the issue:
Like intrastate divisions, the division of the nation into circuits is an intrafederal
jurisdictional scheme. To the extent that each circuit has its own body of binding
precedent (uniformly regarded as binding only within defined jurisdictional limits) then,
in the absence of authoritative Supreme Court disposition of the particular issue in
question, differences among the circuits give rise to intrafederal disputes and thus
genuine conflicts within the meaning of conflict of laws analysis, and require a choice to
be made where the interests of the nonforum jurisdiction are significant. 237

In such instances, federal courts typically address Fourth
Amendment claims on the basis of a choice of law construct, adopting
removed” doctrine, resulting in the continued tolerance of a split identified here. See infra
Appendix A.
235. Justin F. Marceau, The Fourth Amendment at a Three-Way Stop, 62 ALA. L. REV. 687,
733–42 (2011).
236. See id. at 711–17 (discussing Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), and limits in federal
habeas provisions that limit state prisoners’ ability to seek federal habeas relief based on alleged
Fourth Amendment violations).
237. United States v. Gerena, 667 F. Supp. 911, 927 (D. Conn. 1987). It warrants mention
that the question of which legal framework to apply remains a vexing one for state courts as
well. See State v. Torres, 262 P.3d 1006 (Haw. 2011) (surveying various choice of law approaches
adopted by state courts). In general, the area remains vastly underexamined and
undertheorized, which is both odd and troublesome given the increasing state-state and statefederal cooperative efforts of law enforcement. See Logan, supra note 107, at 1247–48 (noting
widespread cooperative efforts undertaken by modern law enforcement).
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a lex loci (“law of the place”) approach,238 which applies the law of the
circuit in which the allegedly unlawful search or seizure occurred.
According to this view, because officers cannot be expected to know
the law of another circuit, where a case might ultimately be filed, 239
the exclusionary rule should not be applied because its deterrent
purpose would not be served.240
Whatever its wisdom,241 the approach functions to ensure the
extrajurisdictional influence of circuit doctrinal preferences. Federal
courts must ascertain and apply the law of the search or seizure situs,
not the forum in which they sit, in a fashion akin to that required by
Erie Railroad Company v. Tompkins242 with state substantive law
determinations. When this occurs, until such time as the Supreme
Court conclusively states otherwise, a circuit position, even if
embodying a distinct minority (indeed, solitary) view, can influence
federal prosecutions beyond its bounds. Whether the external effect of
these spillovers is seen as positive or negative of course depends on
one’s doctrinal perspective. Regardless, while as a general rule the
238. See, e.g., United States v. Gates, Crim. No. 08-42-P-H, 2008 WL 5382285 (D. Me. Dec.
19, 2008) (applying Fourth Circuit law on illegal seizures); United States v. Longo, 70 F. Supp.
2d 225 (W.D.N.Y. 1999) (applying Sixth Circuit law of consent in motion to suppress wiretap);
United States v. Restrepo, 890 F. Supp. 180 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (applying Sixth Circuit law on
illegal seizures); cf. United States v. Ferrara, 771 F. Supp. 1266 (D. Mass. 1991) (opining that
federal prosecution in Connecticut would apply First Circuit law on wiretap permissibility).
239. See Restrepo, 890 F. Supp. at 191 (“The Memphis officers should have been able to rely
on their understanding of the law in the Sixth Circuit and could not have been expected to know
the law in circuits other than the one in which they were operating.”).
240. The Restrepo court continued:
[S]uppression of evidence inadmissible in [the Second Circuit] but admissible in the
Sixth Circuit would not deter misconduct of officers based [in the Sixth Circuit];
rather, it would penalize officers’ good faith efforts to comply with the law.
Correlatively, suppressing evidence in [the Second Circuit] based on illegality in the
Sixth Circuit, irrespective of its admissibility in [the Second Circuit], makes sense
since it ensures that the proper level of deterrence is maintained in the locale where
the violation occurred.
Id. Extracircuit effect also appears possible when courts assess whether other crimes, wrongs, or
acts, occurring elsewhere, are admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). See United
States v. Ozuna, 129 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1352 (S.D. Fla. 2001) (noting “choice of law conundrum”
presented by consideration of prior Maryland arrest for drugs, based on varied Fourth and
Eleventh Circuit doctrine, but deciding that arrest would have been permissible under Eleventh
Circuit’s more demanding standard), aff’d, 48 F. App’x 739 (11th Cir. 2002).
241. One could argue, for instance, that admitting evidence not otherwise admissible in the
forum circuit undermines judicial integrity—that the forum is diminished by allowing
consideration of evidence illegally secured under the forum’s precedent. The judicial integrity
rationale of the exclusionary rule, however, has been superseded by exclusive concern over
whether exclusion holds deterrence promise. See Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 141 n.2
(2009) (dismissing dissenting Justice Ginsburg’s “majestic conception” of the exclusionary rule as
it relates to judicial integrity, stating that “[m]ajestic or not, our cases reject this conception”).
242. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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effects of constitutional rights are not externalized,243 this is one
context in which they are.
b. “Clearly Established” Rights and Civil Rights Litigation
Federal circuit disuniformity can also affect civil rights
litigation.244 To avoid a successful qualified immunity defense by an
individual government actor, and to secure monetary relief, a plaintiff
must prove that (1) the actor violated a constitutional right that is (2)
“clearly established” at the time of the challenged conduct.245 Today,
as mentioned earlier, after Pearson v. Callahan246 reviewing courts
can dispose of cases solely on the basis of the second prong of the test,
avoiding a right-merits determination.247
Application of the “clearly established” standard is
unremarkable when the constitutionality of the government behavior
in question has been resolved by the Supreme Court or the forum
circuit.248 However, circuit splits complicate matters in two contexts.
The first is when the constitutionality of the alleged
misconduct has not been definitively addressed by the Court or the
forum circuit. In such an instance, splits can serve as a basis to extend
qualified immunity because no “robust ‘consensus of persuasive

243. See Michael E. Solimine, The Future of Parity, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1457, 1485–86
(2005) (citing Judge Richard Posner in support of that argument).
244. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) (allowing suit against state and local government actors);
Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (suit against federal
government actors). Indeed, although beyond the ambit of the instant study, it warrants mention
that the circuits are divided on basic questions concerning the litigation of civil rights suits. See,
e.g., Amelia A. Friedman, Note, Qualified Immunity in the Fifth Circuit: Identifying the
“Obvious” Hole in Clearly Established Law, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1283, 1290–91 (2012) (noting, inter
alia, a circuit split on whether courts can consider policies and regulations as sources of clearly
established law); Adrienne Lewis, Note, The Fourth Amendment—The Burden of Proof for
Exigent Circumstances in a Warrantless Search Civil Action, 65 SMU L. REV. 221 (2012)
(discussing circuit split on whether defendant or government has burden of proof regarding
existence of exigent circumstances in instances of warrantless home entry by police).
245. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). The expectation is that “every
‘reasonable official would understand what he is doing violates [the law].’ ” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd,
131 S. Ct. 2074, 2083 (2011) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)); see also
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (stating that qualified immunity shields
government actors “from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate
clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known”).
246. 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009).
247. Id. at 242 (making it a matter of discretion what “order of decision making will best
facilitate the fair and efficient disposition of each case”).
248. See MICHAEL AVERY ET AL., POLICE MISCONDUCT: LAW AND LITIGATION § 3.7 (2011)
(noting same).
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authority’ ” exists.249 As the Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, recently
stated, “Where no controlling authority specifically prohibits a
defendant’s conduct and when the federal circuit courts are split on
the issue, the law cannot be said to be clearly established.”250 Under
such a circumstance, circuit court disuniformity on a Fourth
Amendment issue can serve as a shield for government actors, based
on a successful qualified immunity defense.251 At the same time, it
possibly allows for continued existence of a split (as occurred in
Pearson itself)252 and underenforcement of an ostensibly national
right.253
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Ashcroft v. al-Kidd254
suggests another way in which disuniformity can function to shield
governmental actors—“national officeholders” in particular. In alKidd, an individual filed a federal civil rights action against former
Attorney General John Ashcroft,255 alleging that Ashcroft detained
him as a material witness as a preventive detention measure, without
any actual intent to use him as a witness and without sufficient
evidence to charge him with any crime.256 The Ninth Circuit agreed,257
but the Supreme Court reversed. Justice Scalia, writing for the Court,
concluded that al-Kidd’s Fourth Amendment rights were not violated
because he was held on a valid warrant issued by a magistrate and
that the government’s motive in detaining him, even if pretextual, was
irrelevant.258 More important to the present discussion was the
249. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2084 (quoting Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 617 (1999)).
250. Morgan v. Swanson, 659 F.3d 359, 372 (5th Cir. 2011) (en banc).
251. Of course, a uniform stance among other circuits on the constitutionality of challenged
government conduct can likewise serve as a shield when neither the Court nor the forum circuit
has addressed the issue. See, e.g., Pearson, 555 U.S. at 244 (attaching importance to uniform
circuit approval of “consent-once-removed” doctrine regarding undercover officers).
252. See id. at 244–45 (failing to address the merits of the Tenth Circuit’s conclusion that
the “consent-once-removed” doctrine covers confidential informants, splitting from view of the
Sixth and Seventh Circuits).
253. See John C. Jeffries, Reversing the Order of Battle in Constitutional Torts, 2009 SUP.
CT. REV. 115, 131 (observing that costs of avoidance “are not measured solely, even chiefly, in the
persistence of uncertainty in the law. The greater problem is the underenforcement of
constitutional rights while such uncertainty continues.”).
254. 131 S. Ct. 2074 (2011).
255. The statute allows a federal judge to “order the arrest of [a] person” whose testimony is
“material in a criminal proceeding . . . if it is shown that it may become impracticable to secure
the presence of the person by subpoena.” 18 U.S.C. § 3144 (2006). The witness must be released
if his or her testimony “can adequately be secured by deposition, and if further detention is not
necessary to prevent a failure of justice.” Id.
256. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2079.
257. See al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d 949 (9th Cir. 2009).
258. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2083.
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Court’s analysis of the qualified immunity question. In a pointed
rebuke to the Ninth Circuit, Justice Scalia condemned the latter
court’s conclusion that a federal trial court decision (from another
circuit) condemning Ashcroft’s behavior qualified as clearly
established law.259
Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and
Sotomayor, concurred and elaborated on the clearly established
question, emphasizing that a defendant’s status as a national officer
“must inform what law is clearly established.”260 Unlike government
defendants acting within a single jurisdiction, an official such as the
Attorney General “sets policies implemented in many jurisdictions
throughout the country” and hence may be subject to varied circuit
positions on particular legal matters.261 Such conflicts, Justice
Kennedy wrote, oblige greater solicitude on the issue of qualified
immunity:
A national officeholder intent on retaining qualified immunity need not abide by the
most stringent standard adopted anywhere in the United States. And the national
officeholder need not guess at when a relatively small set of appellate precedents have
established a binding rule. If national officeholders were subject to personal liability
whenever they confronted disagreement among appellate courts, those officers would be
deterred from the full use of their legal authority. . . . Furthermore, too expansive a view
of “clearly established law” would risk giving local judicial determinations the effect of
rules with de facto national significance, contrary to the normal process of ordered
appellate review. 262

At least to four members of the Court, it thus appears that
circuit splits have additional special consequence for “national
officeholder[s],” a matter of particular significance given the
increasing involvement of such officeholders in law enforcement
operations,263 including relative to national security matters.264

259. Id. at 2083–84 (citing United States v. Awadallah, 202 F. Supp. 55, 57 n.28 (S.D.N.Y.
2002)).
260. Id. at 2086 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
261. See id. (“The official with responsibilities in many jurisdictions may face ambiguous
and sometimes inconsistent sources of decisional law. While it may be clear that one Court of
Appeals may have approved a certain course of conduct, other Courts of Appeals may have
disapproved it, or at least reserved the issue.”).
262. Id. at 2087.
263. See Logan, supra note 107, at 1247–48 (noting increased state-federal cooperation in
law enforcement activities).
264. See al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 1278 (noting that “[t]he consequences of [over] deterrence
must counsel caution by the Judicial Branch, particularly in the area of national security”).
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c. “Good Faith” Reliance on “Settled” Case Law and the Exclusionary
Rule
Circuit disuniformity could well also influence application of
the exclusionary rule. Since United States v. Leon265 law enforcement
agents have been forgiven their “good faith” mistakes over the
constitutionality of their actions. While to date the Court has not
expressly applied the exception beyond specified circumstances, such
as when police act pursuant to an invalid warrant,266 statutory
authority,267 or a defective database,268 lower courts have extended the
exception to other contexts.269 More important, six Justices seemingly
backed an expansive orientation in the Court’s recent opinion in Davis
v. United States,270 which addressed whether the exclusionary rule
should apply when police satisfy binding constitutional precedent that
is later reversed.
In Davis, Alabama police, relying on the expansive authority
afforded by New York v. Belton,271 arrested Davis for driving while
intoxicated, secured him in a patrol car, and upon searching his
vehicle discovered an illegal handgun inside.272 While Davis was
convicted of the federal firearms charge, he preserved his Fourth
Amendment claim that the auto search was impermissible, based on
the Supreme Court’s intervening grant of certiorari in Arizona v.
Gant, which challenged the continued validity of Belton’s per se rule.
In due course, the Gant Court significantly limited police
authority to search vehicles incident to arrest, allowing a search only
if an “arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger
compartment at the time of the search or it is reasonable to believe the
vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest.”273 With his case on
direct appeal before the Eleventh Circuit, Davis argued that neither
requirement prescribed by Gant—announced two years after police
searched his vehicle—was satisfied, requiring suppression of the
265. 468 U.S. 897, 909 (1984) (withholding application of the exclusionary rule when police
act with objectively “reasonable good-faith belief” that their conduct is lawful).
266. Id. at 926.
267. Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987).
268. Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (2009); Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 (1995).
269. See, e.g., United States v. Grote, 629 F. Supp. 2d 1201, 1206 (E.D. Wash. 2009)
(surveying cases extending good faith exception to situations not expressly addressed by the
Court).
270. 131 S. Ct. 2419 (2011).
271. 453 U.S. 454, 458–59 (1981).
272. Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2428.
273. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 351 (2009).
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firearm discovered and reversal of his conviction.274 The Eleventh
Circuit disagreed, holding that while traditional retroactivity law
obliged that the new rule announced in Gant apply to Davis’s case, as
it was on direct appeal,275 the exclusionary rule did not apply because
its deterrent function would not be served when police acted in
objectively reasonable reliance on settled precedent, “even when that
precedent is subsequently overturned.”276
In an opinion authored by Justice Alito, joined by five other
Justices, the Court agreed. Because the vehicle search complied with
Belton and settled Eleventh Circuit precedent,277 the requisite officer
“culpability” sufficient to serve the deterrence rationale of the
exclusionary rule was lacking.278 “[W]hen binding appellate precedent
specifically authorizes a particular police practice, well-trained officers
will and should use that tool to fulfill their crime-detection and public
safety responsibilities.”279 Leon’s good faith exception applies when
police, as in Davis, act in “objectively reasonable reliance on binding
appellate precedent.”280
Davis, while surely important for its diminution of retroactivity
doctrine and emphasis on the need for police “culpability” in good faith
analysis, also has the potential to elevate the practical importance of
circuit splits. This much was evident in the concurrence of Justice
Sotomayor and the dissent of Justice Breyer (joined by Justice
Ginsburg). Justice Sotomayor, who at oral argument voiced concern
over the effect of circuit splits,281 agreed that deterrence would not be
appreciably served by holding police responsible for binding appellate
precedent that is later overruled.282 However, she was at pains to
emphasize that the majority’s holding did not concern an instance
274. 598 F.3d 1259, 1262 (11th Cir. 2010).
275. See id. at 1263 (citing Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328 (1987)).
276. Id. at 1264.
277. See Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2428 (citing New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981), and
United States v. Gonzalez, 71 F.3d 819, 822 (11th Cir. 1996)).
278. Id.
279. Id. at 2429.
280. Id. at 2434; see also id. at 2429 (“Evidence obtained during a search conducted in
reasonable reliance on binding precedent is not subject to the exclusionary rule.”).
281. See Transcript of Oral Argument, Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419 (2011) (No.
09–11328), 2011 WL 972573 at *33:
JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Well, if there’s a circuit split, how do we encourage police
officers to be careful about the Fourth Amendment? . . . If there’s a circuit split and a
police officer knows that other circuits are saying this is unconstitutional, why are we
taking away the deterrent effect of having thoughts occur to the officer about thinking
through whether there’s a better way and a legal way to do things?
282. Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2435 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
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when the constitutionality of a challenged police practice “is
unsettled.”283 Justice Breyer’s dissent inferred just such a broader
view of the Davis majority. If police culpability is a prerequisite,
Justice Breyer reasoned, the good faith exception will also cover
situations when an officer conducts a search thought constitutional
“but which, it turns out, falls just outside the Fourth Amendment’s
bounds,” or when clear circuit precedent “just does not exist” on the
constitutionality of the conduct in question.284
Given the undisguised hostility that many of the Court’s
members have for the exclusionary rule, it would come as no surprise
to soon see what Justice Breyer called the majority’s “new ‘good faith’
exception” for police reliance on unsettled case law assume a more
concrete form. Indeed, the Eleventh Circuit in Davis itself noted a
judicial tendency to extend good faith to a situation when “intercircuit
caselaw” is “‘unclear’” as a result of circuit disuniformity.285 It
certainly could be argued that an officer, working in a circuit lacking a
definitive decision on the constitutionality of a search or seizure
practice, and mindful of varied circuit positions on the practice, 286
lacks the kind of “deliberate, reckless or grossly negligent” conduct
now seemingly required.287 If so, much as in the qualified immunity
context, which shares the same standard of objective
reasonableness,288 circuit disuniformity could serve as a defensive
shield for government actors and the underenforcement of a
constitutional norm.

283. Id.; see also id. (“Whether exclusion would deter Fourth Amendment violations where
appellate precedent does not specifically authorize a certain practice and, if so, whether the
benefits of exclusion would outweigh its costs are questions unanswered by our previous
decisions.”).
284. Id. at 2439 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
285. United States v. Davis, 598 F.3d 1259, 1264 n.3 (citing United States v. Brunette, 256
F.3d 14, 19–20 (1st Cir. 2001)).
286. As Professor LaFave notes in his treatise, the Court’s heavy emphasis on the
reasonable reliance of the officer in Davis amounted to either “fantasized reliance or
conclusively-presumed reliance” given the absence of any record evidence of the officer’s actual
awareness of Eleventh Circuit precedent allowing the challenged conduct. 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE,
SEARCH & SEIZURE § 1.3 (4th ed. 2011).
287. Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2408; Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 144 (2009).
288. See Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 565 n.8 (2004) (stating that the “same standard of
objective reasonableness” applies in Leon suppression hearings and qualified immunity
hearings).
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d. Federal Forum Shopping
One final practical ramification of circuit disuniformity relates
to possible forum shopping. As noted earlier, enablement of “forum
shopping among circuits” was one of the four concerns singled out by
the Federal Courts Study Committee in 1990 when assessing if a
circuit split was “intolerable.”289
The federal government enjoys expansive authority to bring
criminal charges by virtue of its flexible venue rules,290 especially
when prosecuting child pornography and obscenity,291 mail/wire
fraud,292 and conspiracy cases.293 More generally, multidistrict
offenses, such as those involving cybercrime,294 may be prosecuted “in
any district in which [an] offense was begun, continued, or
completed.”295
Forum shopping is a recognized feature of modern criminal
justice. The most well-known instance occurs when concurrent state
and federal jurisdiction exists over misconduct and cases “go federal,”
due to what are seen as more prosecution-friendly federal law and
punishment options.296 Yet forum shopping also occurs intrafederally.
The phenomenon was in evidence when the U.S. government decided
to prosecute Zacarias Moussaoui in the Eastern District of Virginia,
not New York, because the former was viewed as more conducive to

289. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
290. See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez-Moreno, 526 U.S. 275, 281 (1999) (“[W]here a
crime consists of distinct parts which have different localities the whole may be tried where any
part can be proved to have been done.”); United States v. Bowens, 224 F.3d 302, 314 (4th Cir.
2002) (“Venue [for a criminal case] will lie wherever . . . essential conduct elements [of the
charged offense] have occurred. Venue will also lie where the effects of the defendant’s conduct
are felt . . . .”).
291. See U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 9-75.400 (2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/
usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/ (stating that prosecution can occur where material is
mailed, deposited, or received or an intermediate through which the material passes).
292. U.S. DEP ’T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL § 967, available at
http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/crm00000.htm (stating that
prosecutions “may be instituted in any district in which an interstate or foreign transmission
was issued or terminated”).
293. See United States v. Smith, 198 F.3d 377, 383 (2d Cir. 1999) (“In a conspiracy
prosecution, ‘venue is proper in any district in which an overt act . . . was committed by any of
the coconspirators.’ ” (quoting United States v. Naranjo, 14 F.3d 145, 147 (2d Cir. 1994))).
294. See COMPUTER CRIME & INTELLECTUAL PROP. SECTION, U.S. DEP ’T OF JUSTICE,
PROSECUTING COMPUTER CRIMES 118, available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/cybercrime
/docs/ccmanual.pdf (classifying cybercrime as an offense controlled by 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a)
governing multidistrict offenses).
295. 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a) (2006).
296. See Logan, supra note 107, at 1248–49.
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prosecutorial interests.297 Federal rules also permit strategic filing in
less high-profile cases. The United States Attorneys’ Manual, for
instance, expressly allows for consideration of “legal or evidentiary
problems that might attend prosecution” when venue permits filing in
more than one district.298 While interoffice competition among U.S.
Attorney offices perhaps makes it unlikely for a case to be channeled
to another circuit, one with a more attractive (i.e., less demanding)
Fourth Amendment position, the possibility nonetheless exists.299
Moreover, as Professor Dan Richman has noted, prosecutors are not
the sole deciders of federal criminal filings. Law enforcement officials
“are primarily responsible for case selection and choice of investigative
tactics,”300 and influence choice over the “best” district to which to
channel cases.301
Federal courts typically condone forum shopping,302 albeit not
always happily.303 Professor Amanda Frost, in assessing federal circuit
splits in the area of federal civil statutes and regulations, has offered
that forum shopping can be “entirely benign”:
As long as both parties have the latitude to argue for their favored forum . . . there is
nothing wrong with each attempting to have the case heard where they prefer—whether
because it is more convenient, the jury or judges seem more sympathetic, or the law in
the circuit is more favorable. 304

With federal criminal litigation, however, forum selection discretion is
entirely one sided—the government makes the call.305 This offers
potential strategic advantage to a single party. Furthermore, physical
297. See Paul Bradley, Terrorism Trial Is First Major Test, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH,
Dec. 27, 2011, at A1.
298. U.S. ATTORNEYS ’ MANUAL, supra note 291, § 9-27.240(B), (B)(2); see also id. § 9-75.100
(specifying that “[i]n deciding in which district(s) to initiate charges” the “applicable law” should
be among the factors considered).
299. Indeed, Professor Hellman’s study of circuit splits highlighted the consciousness of and
effect on the practice of the Army Corps of Engineers, a federal executive actor like the
Department of Justice, relative to varied circuit positions on the interpretation of federal
statutory requirements. See Hellman, supra note 50, at 747–48.
300. Daniel Richman, Prosecutors and Their Agents, Agents and Their Prosecutors, 103
COLUM. L. REV. 749, 751 (2003).
301. Id. at 759–60, 783–84.
302. See, e.g., United States v. Bagnell, 679 F.2d 826, 832 (11th Cir. 1982) (holding that
venue was proper in the district in which materials were received, notwithstanding forum shopping allegation).
303. See, e.g., United States v. Coleman, 162 F. Supp. 2d 582, 589 (N.D. Tex. 2001) (noting
occurrence of forum-shopping and encouraging the Fifth Circuit to assess whether it qualifies as
the kind of “abuse and/or collusion” that warrants further scrutiny).
304. Frost, supra note 13, at 1602.
305. See Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 116 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (observing
that “[t]he criminal defendant is an involuntary litigant”).
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liberty, not civil monetary damages or injunctive relief, hangs in the
balance, accentuating the consequences of the government monopoly.
IV. A PROPOSED SOLUTION
If one accepts that the disuniformity highlighted here is
problematic, and that more clarity and consistency in national
constitutional law is desirable, the question arises over how best to
proceed. While splits figure centrally in the Court’s current docket,306
which is now smaller than at any time in recent history,307 the matters
subject to plenary review have been characterized as often being “close
to trivial” in nature.308 Meanwhile, dozens of constitutional conflicts,
such as those involving the Fourth Amendment matters noted here, go
unresolved.
Any solution, it must be noted, is complicated by the limited
range of institutional options available. When federal courts differ on
the meaning of a statute, potential recourse lies in legislative action:
Congress can amend the statute309 or provide clarification based on a
question certified by a federal court.310 Questions concerning the
meaning and application of constitutional provisions, however, are
within the sole purview of the judiciary,311 with the Supreme Court
having ultimate say.312 Given this reality, focus must remain on the
306. See Frost, supra note 13, at 1569 (noting that up to seventy percent of the Court’s
docket concerns a judicial split of some sort); see also Stephen G. Breyer, Reflections on the Role
of Appellate Courts: A View from the Supreme Court, 8 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 91, 92 (2006) (“A
lower court split . . . is a major part of what I look for when I review the stack of [certiorari
recommendation] memos of law clerks.”).
307. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
308. Frost, supra note 13, at 1659. The menial quality of the Court’s plenary docket would
thus appear to defy the intent of at least one sitting Justice. See Breyer, supra note 306, at 96
(noting that the Court is “not particularly interested in ironing out minor linguistic discrepancies
among the lower courts because those discrepancies are not outcome determinative”).
309. See Stephanie A. Lindquist & David A. Yalof, Congressional Responses to Federal
Circuit Decisions, 85 JUDICATURE 61, 66–67 (2001) (noting that between 1990 and 1998 Congress
sought to amend existing statutes or enact new laws to resolve at least nineteen federal circuit
splits). The practice would appear to align with a proposal advanced by then-Judge Ruth
Ginsburg under which “Congress would take a second look at a law once a court opinion or two
highlighted the measure’s infirmities.” Ruth Bader Ginsburg, A Plea for Legislative Review, 60 S.
CAL. L. REV. 995, 996 (1987).
310. See generally Amanda Frost, Certifying Questions to Congress, 101 NW. U. L. REV . 1,
11–13 (2007).
311. See supra notes 203–04 and accompanying text.
312. What Professor Monaghan has referred to as the “constitutional common law,” not
“subject to amendment, modification or even reversal by Congress.” Henry P. Monaghan, The
Supreme Court, 1974 Term—Forward: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2–3, 31
(1975); see also Tara Leigh Grove, The Structural Role for Vertical Maximalism, 95 CORNELL L.
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Court, a daunting specter given its impressive ability to evade
successive reform efforts that seek to modify or limit its agendasetting prerogative and authority.313
Yet an option remains, one with necessary institution-forcing
effect: certification. Although certification is now largely ignored,
federal courts of appeals have long had the power to certify legal
questions to the Supreme Court for authoritative determination when
disagreement exists. The practice of certification dates back to 1802
when Congress, concerned that the six two-member circuit courts then
in existence would create intracircuit splits, instructed that the Court
upon certification “shall . . . finally decide . . . any question . . . before a
circuit court upon which the opinions of the judges shall be
opposed.”314 Indeed, a circuit “division of opinion” was the only way
that a criminal case could reach the Court until 1889,315 and

REV. 1, 9 (2009) (noting that the Court has always played the “leading role in defining the
content of federal law for the judiciary”); Henry P. Monaghan, On Avoiding Avoidance, Agenda
Control, and Related Matters, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 665, 681 n.79 (2012) [hereinafter Monaghan,
Avoiding Avoidance] (referring to the Supreme Court as “the priestly interpreter of our
Constitution”).
313. See supra notes 40–42 and accompanying text. For examples of more recent proposals
see, for example, Paul D. Carrington & Roger C. Cramton, Judicial Independence in Excess:
Reviving the Judicial Duty of the Supreme Court, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 587 (2009) (urging
creation of a certiorari division of appellate judges to select cases for the Court to decide); George
& Guthrie, supra note 11 (advocating an increase in the size of the Court’s membership,
authorizing panel decisions of the Court, and retaining en banc procedure for select cases); David
S. Law, How to Rig the Federal Courts, 99 GEO. L.J. 779 (2011) (urging adoption of a National
Court of Appeals, first proposed by the Freund Committee).
One option could involve creation of a specialized court for constitutional criminal
appeals, akin to that created for intellectual property law matters (the Federal Circuit).
However, such a court, in addition to its political vulnerability to attacks from those desiring to
maintain the status quo, would be problematic. Concern over judicial bias or capture, even
involving life-tenure judges not subject to politically mortal sound bites of “pro-defendant”
outcomes, would be a constant. See POSNER, supra note 121, at 254–56 (asserting that outcomes
of specialized courts can be controlled by membership appointments); Richard L. Revesz,
Specialized Courts and the Administrative Lawmaking System, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1111, 1149–53
(1990) (discussing how special interest groups are more likely to capture specialized courts than
courts of general jurisdiction). Perhaps more important, channeling constitutional criminal
matters away from the Supreme Court would have negative structural effects. As Paul
Carrington long ago observed: “Whatever may be said about specialization of courts dealing with
esoteric, highly technical subjects, there is little to be said for narrowing specialization in a field
so dominated by basic human values as is the criminal law.” Carrington, supra note 40, at 576–
77.
314. Act of Apr. 29, 1802, ch. 31, § 6, 2 Stat. 156, 159; see also United States v. Daniel, 19
U.S. (6 Wheat.) 542, 548 (1821) (Marshall, C.J.) (offering that in the absence of certification a
“division of opinion” might “remain and the question would continue unsettled”).
315. See United States v. Rider, 163 U.S. 132, 138 (1896) (noting that with criminal cases “a
certificate of division was the only mode in which alleged errors could be reviewed”).
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certification was a mainstay in nineteenth-century criminal cases.316
Later, certification played a central role in the Evarts Act in 1891,
creating the modern courts of appeals, providing a means to “guard
against diversity of judgment” by “send[ing] up” divisive legal
questions.317 Availability of certification also paved the way in the
Judiciary Act of 1925 for approval of increased certiorari authority of
the Court, assuring Congress that the Justices would not unilaterally
control their plenary docket, but would rather share control with the
courts of appeals.318
While in subsequent decades certification remained a prime
vehicle to the Supreme Court in civil and criminal cases alike,319 it has
enjoyed scant use in recent years. Even though both the U.S. Code 320
and Supreme Court Rule 19321 allow certification and it technically
remains a vestige of the Court’s mandatory appellate jurisdiction,322
the Court has only rarely accepted certified questions since 1940, and
not a single instance of certification has been recorded since 1981.323
Writing in 1949, Professors Moore and Vestal offered an explanation
for the aversion that likely still obtains: that the Court fears that
certification will “frustrate [its] proper functioning as a policy-

316. See Leonard G. Ratner, Congressional Power over the Appellate Jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 157, 196 (1960) (“Certification of questions occurred
frequently in criminal cases. A persistent conflict in lower court decisions could be expected to
result, sooner or later, in a divergence of opinion among the judges of one of the circuit courts,
permitting the question to be certified to the Supreme Court for resolution.”).
317. See 21 CONG. REC. 10,222 (1890) (statement of Sen. William Evarts).
318. See Hartnett, supra note 20, at 1710 (“In the hearings on the Judges’ Bill, it was
repeatedly noted that the Supreme Court would not alone control its jurisdiction, but that the
courts of appeals, by use of certification, would share in that control.”).
319. See id. at 1656 (discussing frequent resort to certification).
320. See 28 U.S.C. § 1254(2) (2006) (“Cases in the court of appeals may be reviewed by the
Supreme Court . . . [b]y certification at any time by a court of appeals of any question in any civil
or criminal case as to which instructions are desired . . . .”).
321. See SUP. CT. R. 19(1) (“A United States court of appeals may certify to this Court a
question or proposition of law on which it seeks instruction for the proper decision of a case.”).
322. See 17 CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 4038, at 62–64
(3d ed. 2006) (stating that “in form and history . . . certified question jurisdiction is mandatory”);
Felix Frankfurter & James M. Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court at October Term, 1929,
44 HARV. L. REV. 1, 36 (1930) (“Petitions for certiorari the Court can deny, but questions certified
must be answered.”). Consistent with this status, when the Court refuses to hear a certified
question the matter is “dismissed,” whereas a petition for a writ of certiorari is “denied.” See, e.g.,
United States v. Seale, 130 S. Ct. 12, 12 (2009) (“The question certified by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit is dismissed.”).
323. Id. at 13 (Stevens, J., dissenting from dismissal of certified question).
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determining body by greatly restricting the time available for the
discretionary side of its docket.”324
This Article joins a handful of other recent commentaries
urging rejuvenation of the well-established practice of certification.325
Plainly, something more is needed to oblige the Court to resolve the
circuit splits discussed here, which number among what Justice Story
called the “jarring and discordant judgments” that only the Court can
“harmonize . . . into uniformity.”326 While scholars continue to debate
the reasons behind the Court’s shrinking plenary docket—ranging
from risk-averse law clerks whose recommendations dominate the
“cert. pool” used by Justices,327 to the retirement of Justice Byron
White, an outspoken advocate of the view that the Court should
resolve circuit splits328—unresolved splits on constitutional questions
endure and proliferate with each Court term.
The certification statute, now codified at 28 United States Code
Section 1254,329 should be retooled by Congress330 to explicitly require
324. James W. Moore & Alan D. Vestal, Present and Potential Role of Certification in
Federal Appellate Procedure, 35 VA. L. REV. 1, 25 (1949); see also EUGENE GRESSMAN ET AL.,
SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 597 (9th ed. 2007) (noting that the Court disfavors broadened use of
certification because it “would frustrate the Court’s discretionary power to limit its review to
cases it deems worthy” and afford lower courts power to dictate its docket).
325. See George & Guthrie, supra note 11, at 1449–51 (urging greater use of certification
more generally in resolving circuit splits); Aaron Nielson, The Death of the Supreme Court’s
Certified Question Jurisdiction, 59 CATH. U. L. REV . 483, 492 (2010); Amanda L. Tyler, Setting
the Supreme Court’s Agenda: Is There a Place for Certification?, 78 GEO . WASH. L. REV. 1310,
1313 (2010); Kevin G. Crennan, Note, The Viability of Certification in Federal Appellate
Procedure, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2025 (2011).
326. Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 347 (1816).
327. See Owens & Simon, supra note 228, at 1234–37.
328. Id. at 1241–42.
329. The statute notes specific circumstances under which certification is appropriate:
Cases in the courts of appeals may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by the following
methods:
By writ of certiorari granted upon the petition of any party to any civil or criminal
case, before or after rendition of judgment or decree;
By certification at any time by a court of appeals of any question of law in any civil or
criminal case as to which instructions are desired, and upon such certification the
Supreme Court may give binding instructions or require the entire record to be sent
up for decision of the entire matter in controversy.
28 U.S.C. § 1254 (2006). A parallel provision is contained in the Court’s rules. See SUP. CT. R. 19
(“A United States court of appeals may certify to [the Supreme Court] a question or proposition
of law on which it seeks instruction for the proper decision of a case.”).
330. Ideally, the change advocated here would emanate from the Court itself. However, the
Court’s dismissive treatment of certification in recent decades belies faith that the Court would
undertake on its own a change making certification explicitly nondiscretionary in nature.
Congress would enjoy authority to make such a change under Article III, which expressly affords
Congress power to impose “regulations” regarding the Court’s appellate jurisdiction. See U.S.
CONST. art. III, § 2.
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that the Court accept a certified question of constitutional law on
which the circuits have split.331 How and when such certification can
be sought and must be granted, however, presents a potentially
confounding empirical question. Under the current discretionary
certiorari regime, as discussed, circuits lack compelling basis to heed
one another’s positions on issues, and the Supreme Court can and does
avoid resolving conflicts that arise. With mandatory jurisdiction, a
circuit court could in effect dictate Court jurisdiction by adopting a
discordant stance (as apparently occurred in the circuit-riding era).332
While research suggests that fear of reversal by the Supreme Court in
itself does not drive circuit case outcomes,333 the negative reputational
and other professional and institutional consequences of reversal
make it doubtful that a court would manufacture a split, and adopt a
position that it otherwise would not, merely to get an issue
docketed.334 Indeed, experience in Florida, where intermediate
appellate courts for more than thirty years have been afforded power
to certify conflict matters to the state supreme court for discretionary
review (which it typically grants), provides no reason to conclude that
circuit courts would conduct themselves in this manner.335 However, if
experience proves otherwise, certification could be limited to instances

331. Consistent with custom, the questions themselves must be distinct and definite. See
WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 9, § 106, at 779:
Certification is limited to questions of law, and the questions must be distinct and
definite. The Court will dismiss a certification in which the questions are so broad
that they in effect bring up the whole case, although when a case has been certified
the Court itself may require that the entire record be sent up for decision of the entire
matter in controversy.
332. See id. (noting that judges on early era two-judge panels would frequently “disagree
deliberately in order to bring a question to the Supreme Court”).
333. See David E. Klein & Robert J. Hume, Fear of Reversal as an Explanation of Lower
Court Compliance, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 579 (2003) (examining a sample of circuit search and
seizure cases over a thirty-year period and emphasizing the importance of the low possibility of
Supreme Court review).
334. See id. at 581–82 (discussing factors accounting for judges’ desire to avoid reversal by
superior courts).
335. Harry L. Anstead et al., The Operation and Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of
Florida, 29 NOVA L. REV. 431, 529–31 (2005); see also WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 9, § 106, at
779 (stating that former practice of manufacturing jurisdiction on basis of dissent is “no longer
considered proper. The courts of appeals recognize that certificates should be granted only when
they actually are in doubt on a question.”).
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when a third circuit court weighs in on a disputed matter,336 removing
the incentive for a second circuit court to engage in gamesmanship.337
Finally, the Court should be afforded a modest degree of
latitude to avoid certification, such as when a case appears to be a
poor vehicle to resolve the contested question, perhaps due to concern
over jurisdiction or justiciability.338 Consistent with transparency
interests, however, the Court should be obliged to specify why it did
not take the case.339
Such a change would have several benefits. First, it would
allow for the accelerated, authoritative resolution of splits.340 This
would lessen the many problems generated by disparate circuit
positions discussed earlier,341 and allow the Court to fulfill its
institutional promise to ensure constitutional uniformity, made
decades ago when it convinced Congress to allow it near-total
discretionary control (via certiorari) over its docket.342 Second, it would
permit creation of a framework for a more dialogic relationship
between the Supreme Court and lower federal courts, enabling “lower
court judges themselves to inform the Court—directly and formally—
that an issue is important” and warrants immediate resolution.343 The
change would thus rehabilitate an important institutional relationship

336. See ESTREICHER & SEXTON, supra note 183, at 58 (deeming a circuit conflict
“intolerable” and deserving of Supreme Court review when “at least three courts have passed on
the question”).
337. Adopting the alternate approach would, however, have the obvious downside of
allowing the difficulties noted earlier to persist until a third court gets around to deciding the
disputed issue.
338. I am indebted to Arthur Hellman for this very helpful suggestion.
339. Similar reason-giving has long been urged in the certiorari denial context where, unlike
here, the enormous volume of petitions significantly undercuts the practicality of such a
requirement. See Kathryn A. Watts, Constraining Certiorari Using Administrative Law
Principles, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 46–47 (2011).
340. See Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Ry. v. Williams, 214 U.S. 492, 495 (1909) (Holmes,
J., dissenting) (stating that “[certified] questions are to be encouraged as a mode of disposing of
cases in the least cumbersome and most meritorious way”).
341. See supra Part III.
342. See Hartnett, supra note 20, at 1705 (noting Justices’ assurance to Congress, when
contemplating passage of the “Judges’ Bill” of 1925, “that certiorari is always granted when there
is a conflict between courts of appeals and would always be granted when there was an arguable
constitutional claim”); see also William H. Taft, The Attacks on the Courts and Legal Procedure, 5
KY. L.J. 3, 18 (1916) (publishing May 23, 1914 remarks that “questions of constitutional
construction” are of such critical importance that they should comprise the Court’s mandatory
appellate jurisdiction).
343. Tyler, supra note 325, at 1326.
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within the federal judiciary,344 a relationship that the earlier
discussion of percolation makes clear is now in a state of major
disrepair.345 Finally, enhanced certification would infuse the Court’s
docket-assemblage process with a welcome measure of transparency
and consistency, lacking in the current idiosyncratic346 and inscrutable
certiorari apparatus.347
Notwithstanding certification’s historic pedigree,348 such a
change would inevitably garner opposition. For instance, those
revering Bickelsian “passive virtues” and judicial restraint349 would
not rush to embrace increased jurisdictional reach of the Court. Nor,
for that matter, will the results ultimately reached by the Court,
imposed nationwide, be to everyone’s liking.350 However, disuniformity
itself presents significant problems, lending credence to the wisdom of
one of Professor Bickel’s near-contemporaries, Justice Brandeis, who
observed that ultimately “it is more important that the applicable rule
of law be settled than that it be settled right.”351 Concern might also
344. See Hartnett, supra note 20, at 1710 (noting that “[i]n hearings on the Judges’ Bill [of
1925], it was repeatedly noted that the Supreme Court would not alone control its jurisdiction,
but that the courts of appeals, by use of certification, would share in that control”).
345. See supra notes 185–205 and accompanying text; see also Arthur D. Hellman, The
Shrunken Docket of the Rehnquist Court, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 403, 436–37 (condemning the
tendency of the Court to “recurrently ignore[] the efforts of lower-court judges to address issues
on its docket, while remaining aloof from the day-to-day operation of the rules it lays down”); cf.
Ashutosh Bhagwhat, Separate but Equal?: The Supreme Court, the Lower Federal Courts, and
the Nature of the “Judicial Power,” 80 B.U. L. REV. 967, 986 (2000) (noting the isolation of the
Supreme Court from the lower federal courts that it supervises).
346. See, e.g., WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, THE COURT YEARS 1939-1975, at 175–76 (1980)
(referring to certiorari selection process as “highly personal”); WILLIAM H. R EHNQUIST, THE
SUPREME COURT, HOW IT WAS, HOW IT IS 265 (1987) (referring to certiorari as a “rather
subjective decision”); Brennan, supra note 204, at 478 (referring to certiorari decisionmaking
process as a matter of “feel”).
347. See Watts, supra note 339, at 14–21 (discussing various concerns over the certioraridominated process by which the Court’s plenary docket takes shape).
348. See supra notes 314–18 and accompanying text.
349. Bickel, supra note 182. For a critical view of the approach, calling into question its
motivational principles, see Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the “Passive Virtues”—A
Comment on Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 25 (1964)
(asserting that “Bickel’s ‘virtues’ are ‘passive’ in name and appearance only; a virulent variety of
free-wheeling interventionism lies at the core of his devices of restraint”).
350. With Fourth Amendment doctrine in particular, general cause for pessimism among
civil libertarians has been mitigated by a few recent cases limiting police search and seizure
authority. See, e.g., Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009) (limiting authority of police to search
auto interiors incident to lawful arrest of recent occupant); Kyllo v. United States, 530 U.S. 1305
(2000) (deeming police scanning of home with thermal imaging equipment a search).
351. Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas, 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see
also Sanford Levinson, Assessing the Supreme Court’s Caseload: A Question of Law or Politics?,
119 YALE L.J. ONLINE 99, 100 (2010) (stating that it need not be the case that “the Court’s own
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be raised, especially by the powerful Supreme Court Bar, that an
infusion of certified cases will crowd out cases the Court might
otherwise select as a result of its certiorari process.352 To the extent
this proves well founded,353 the outcome should be received as a
welcome opening of the constitutional playing field, one consistent
with a less “Olympian” Supreme Court, more helpful to the daily work
of lower federal courts charged with handling the detailed realities of
federal constitutional litigation.354
CONCLUSION
Federal appellate judicial disagreement on issues of federal
law, applicable to the nation as a whole, has long prompted concern.
Curiously, however, to date research and debate have concentrated on
civil, nonconstitutional law, and failed to systematically examine the
actual consequences of splits.355 This Article reports the results of a
first-of-its-kind study of federal constitutional law circuit splits.
Focusing on the Fourth Amendment in particular, the study
highlights the existence of over three dozen current conflicts,
including many that have persisted for years.

decision will exhibit any particularly great wisdom or serve the country well. Rather, it is an
almost Hobbesian argument that there must be a sovereign to resolve controversies, and that
such a role should be played . . . by the Supreme Court.”).
352. See Richard J. Lazarus, Docket Capture at the High Court, 119 YALE L.J. ONLINE 89,
89–90 (2009) (noting influence of “an elite group of expert Supreme Court advocates, dominated
by those in the private bar,” and voicing concern over its “undesirable skewing in the content of
the Court’s docket”); id. at 91 (“[T]he Court regularly grants cases at the urging of leading
members of the private sector Supreme Court bar that are marginally certiorari worthy at best,
at a time when the rates of certiorari are rapidly declining.”); Watts, supra note 339, at 62–63
(discussing powerful role of “expert Supreme Court bar” and the capture risks it creates).
353. As for the accumulated backlog of splits, they could be resolved in any number of ways,
including, at least relative to the Fourth Amendment splits highlighted here, during a single
Term by the Court (added to the roughly eighty cases now annually heard, resulting in a Term
docket of under 120 cases, eminently sustainable by historical standards).
354. See Hellman, supra note 345, at 433 (“The Justices seldom engage in the process of
developing the law through a succession of cases in the common-law tradition. Rather, Court
decisions tend to be singular events, largely unconnected to other cases on the docket and even
more detached from the work of lower [federal] courts.”); see also Donald A. Dripps, The Fourth
Amendment and the Fallacy of Composition: Determinacy Versus Legitimacy in a Regime of
Bright-Line Rules, 74 MISS. L.J. 341, 408 (2004) (urging that the Court take “a larger number of
Fourth Amendment cases, in patterns that enable ongoing oversight of what is, for better or
worse, an important body of judge-made law”).
355. See Wilkinson, supra note 14, at 89 (“The argument that circuit splits should lead to
more prolific Supreme Court review may seem appealing in the abstract, but it breaks down
when proponents are asked to inventory the actual burdens of such splits on litigants and the
public.”).
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The existence of so much variation is surprising given the
Court’s avowed aversion for constitutional disuniformity,356 penchant
for defending its constitutional turf,357 and worry over variable
outcomes relative to federal substantive criminal law.358 It also raises
an array of troubling normative and practical concerns.
While other work has suggested that circuit conflicts consume
an undue amount of attention on the Court’s current docket, this
Article reaches the opposite conclusion. Splits on multiple important
Fourth Amendment issues now warrant resolution by the Court, and
delay or failure is not justified by the instrumental arguments
advanced by those untroubled by disuniformity, such as percolation or
regional experimentation. Furthermore, splits will likely only continue
to increase in number given ever-growing circuit court caseloads and
the modest size of the Court’s certiorari-based plenary docket.
To remedy this institutional deficiency, the Article recommends
resuscitation of a long-dormant vestige of the Court’s mandatory
appellate jurisdiction: certification, modified to ensure that the Court
fulfills its role as the paramount locus vivendi of federal constitutional
law. While the focus here has been on the Fourth Amendment, circuits
disagree on other constitutional criminal procedure matters affecting
physical liberty (if not privacy),359 which certification will
ameliorate.360 Moreover, the enhanced certainty afforded will
356. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
357. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme than Court? The Fall of the Political
Question Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 300–19 (2002)
(surveying decline of Court’s deference to congressional constitutional judgments); Barry
Friedman & Erin F. Delaney, Becoming Supreme: The Federal Foundation of Judicial
Supremacy, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1137, 1172–82 (2011) (noting various arenas in which the
modern Court has expanded its constitutional interpretive authority). At the same time, as
Professor Monaghan recently observed, the Court has been steadfast in its refusal to cede any
measure of its interpretative authority to other judicial actors. See Monaghan, Avoiding
Avoidance, supra note 312, at 688 (noting that Court is “reluctant to leave important
propositions of federal law for final disposition in the hands of judicial actors other than itself”).
358. See, e.g., United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 269 (1997) (“[D]isparate decisions in
various Circuits might leave [federal criminal law] insufficiently certain . . . [and] such a
circumstance may be taken into account in deciding whether the warning is fair enough.”).
359. For instance, whether a Terry stop constitutes “custody” under Miranda doctrine.
Compare United States v. Leshuk, 65 F.3d 1105, 1110 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding that a suspect is
not in custody based on lawful Terry stop), with United States v. Newton, 369 F.3d 659, 673 (2d
Cir. 2004) (deeming reasonableness of Terry stop irrelevant, and instead examining whether the
circumstances of stop qualify as custody); see also, e.g., United States v. Ashley, 664 F.3d 602,
604 (5th Cir. 2011) (noting existence of a split on whether the use of a defendant’s pre-arrest
silence as substantive evidence of guilt violates the Fifth Amendment).
360. Although beyond the scope of the current study, compelling reason exists to extend
certification beyond the constitutional criminal procedure realm, where, while deprivations of
physical liberty might not be implicated, important Bill of Rights and Fourteenth Amendment
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positively affect constitutional litigation concerning federal civil rights
more generally, where circuit disuniformity can influence whether
police violated a “clearly established” right.361
Constitutional consistency has been prized since the nation’s
origin. Nevertheless, scant attention has been paid to the actual
variability of national constitutional law resulting from the decisions
of intermediate federal appellate courts. Except for a few fleeting
references offered decades ago,362 focus on circuit constitutional law
splits, including those that affect criminal procedure rights,363 has
been lacking. This Article has helped redress this empirical deficit and
highlighted the negative consequences associated with Fourth
Amendment circuit splits in particular, hopefully setting the stage for
increased attention to this critically important yet ignored aspect of
American constitutionalism.

civil liberties can be subject to variable circuit treatment, resulting in inconsistent rights
allocation.
361. See supra Part III.B.2.
362. Most notably, the congressional testimony of Justice Byron White, who while
condemning “federal law being enforced differently in different parts of the country,” singled out
for concern varied views on what qualifies as an illegal search. See Intercircuit Panel of the
United States Act: Hearings on S. 704 Before the Subcomm. on Courts of the S. Judiciary Comm.,
99th Cong., 1st Sess. 147 (1985) (testimony of Justice Byron White).
363. See supra notes 42–65 and accompanying text.
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APPENDIX A
Issue

Date Split
Emerged364

Search and Seizure Practices
Whether police can safety “sweep” a residence,
under Maryland v. Buie (1990), without first
arresting an occupant365

2001366

Whether refusal to provide consent to search home
by nonpresent resident trumps consent later
provided by a resident who is present367

2008368

Whether police can engage in warrantless search of
a container that is so distinctive that its contents
are a foregone conclusion, allowing for plain view
search (“single purpose container” doctrine)369

2005370

Whether retention of identification for period longer
than needed to verify identity constitutes a
seizure371

2002372

364. The issues indicated in the Appendix concern “live” splits that continue to exist, at the
time of this writing, based on conflicts manifest during the study period.
365. United States v. Torres-Castro, 470 F.3d 992, 997 (10th Cir. 2006) (disagreeing with,
inter alia, United States v. Martins, 413 F.3d 139, 150 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1011
(2005)).
366. United States v. Taylor, 248 F.3d 506, 513 (6th Cir.) (disagreeing with United States v.
Reid, 226 F.3d 1020, 1028 (9th Cir. 2000)), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 981 (2001).
367. United States v. Henderson, 536 F.3d 776, 781–82 (7th Cir. 2008) (disagreeing with
United States v. Murphy, 516 F.3d 1117 (9th Cir. 2008)), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 59 (2009).
368. United States v. Hudspeth, 518 F.3d 954, 963 (8th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (Melloy, J.,
dissenting) (noting variant approach of United States v. Murphy, 516 F.3d 1117 (9th Cir. 2008)).
369. United States v. Gust, 405 F.3d 797, 804 (9th Cir. 2005) (disagreeing with, inter alia,
United States v. Williams, 41 F.3d 192, 196 (4th Cir. 1994)).
370. Id.; see also Allison M. Lucifer, Comment, You Can Judge a Container by Its Cover: The
Single-Purpose Container Exception and the Fourth Amendment, 76 U. CHI . L. REV. 1809 (2009)
(discussing ongoing split).
371. United States v. Weaver, 282 F.3d 302, 310 (4th Cir.) (disagreeing with, inter alia,
United States v. Jordan, 958 F.2d 1085, 1086 (D.C. Cir. 1992)), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 847 (2002).
372. Id.
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Whether police seizure, supported by reasonable
suspicion, can be prolonged by asking questions
unrelated to seizure basis373

2011374

Whether police seizure, supported by probable
cause, can be prolonged by asking questions
unrelated to seizure basis375

2011376

Whether identity of person discovered as a result of
unlawful seizure by police, resulting in person’s
arrest on unrelated basis, is suppressible377

2001378

Whether police can seize an individual without a
warrant based on reasonable suspicion of a
completed misdemeanor (versus felony)379

2007380

Whether a stop for a minor traffic violation can be
based on reasonable suspicion (not probable
cause)381

2008382

373. United States v. Guijon-Ortiz, 660 F.3d 757, 767–68 (4th Cir. 2011) (noting
disagreement with United States v. Childs, 277 F.3d 947, 954 (7th Cir. 2002)).
374. Id. The Guijdon-Ortiz court emphasized that the issue differed from that resolved in
Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323 (2009), which held that unrelated questioning that does not
prolong a stop is permissible. Id. at 766.
375. Id. at 768 n.9 (noting disagreement with United States v. Childs, 277 F.3d 947, 952
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 829 (2002)).
376. Id.
377. United States v. Scroggins, 599 F.3d 433, 449–50 (5th Cir.) (noting disagreement with,
inter alia, United States v. Olivares-Rangel, 458 F.3d 1104, 1109 (10th Cir. 2006)), cert. denied,
131 S. Ct. 158 (2010).
378. United States v. Guevera, 262 F.3d 751 (8th Cir. 2001) (noting disagreement with, inter
alia, United States v. Guzman-Bruno, 27 F.3d 420, 421 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 975
(1994)).
379. United States v. Moran, 503 F.3d 1135, 1142 n.5 (10th Cir. 2007) (noting disagreement
with Gaddis v. Redford, 364 F.3d 763, 771 (6th Cir. 2007)), cert. denied, 553 U.S. 1035 (2008).
380. United States v. Grigg, 498 F.3d 1070, 1081 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting disagreement with
Gaddis v. Redford, 364 F.3d 763, 771 (6th Cir. 2007)); see also Cecilia R. Byrne, Comment, To
Stop or Not to Stop: The Application or Misapplication of Hensley to Completed Misdemeanors,
12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1191 (2010) (discussing split).
381. United States v. Simpson, 520 F.3d 531, 539–40 (6th Cir. 2008) (noting disagreement
with, inter alia, United States v. Callarman, 273 F.3d 1284, 1287 (10th Cir. 2001), cert. denied,
535 U.S. 1072 (2002)).
382. Id.
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Whether police violate Payton v. New York (1980),
which requires an arrest warrant for an in-home
arrest, when, lacking a warrant, they announce
their presence and arrest resident who voluntarily
opens door383

2004384

How to define “reason to believe” resident is at
home, standard established in Payton v. New York
(1980), in justifying home entry with arrest
warrant385

1999386

Whether “grab area” of arrestee, under United
States v. Chimel (1969), is determined at time of the
arrest or when search is conducted (nonautomobile
context)387

2002388

Whether police, acting on the basis of apparent
authority to give consent to search, can search a
closed container when faced with ambiguity over
container’s ownership389

2010390

383. Hadley v. Williams, 368 F.3d 747, 749 (7th Cir. 2004) (noting disagreement with, inter
alia, United States v. Gori, 230 F.3d 44, 53 (2d Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 824 (2001)).
384. Id.
385. United States v. Barrera, 464 F.3d 501 (5th Cir. 2006) (noting disagreement with, inter
alia, Valdez v. McPheters, 172 F.3d 1220, 1224 (10th Cir. 1999)), cert. denied, 550 U.S. 937
(2007).
386. United States v. Valdez, 172 F.3d 1220, 1224 (10th Cir. 1999) (noting disagreement
with United States v. Harper, 928 F.2d 894, 896 (9th Cir. 1991)).
387. United States v. Myers, 308 F.3d 251, 267 (3d Cir. 2002) (noting disagreement with,
inter alia, United States v. Palumbo, 735 F.2d 1095, 1097 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 934
(1984)).
388. Id.
389. United States v. Taylor, 600 F.3d 678, 686 (6th Cir. 2010) (Kethledge, J., dissenting)
(noting majority’s split with United States v. Snype, 441 F.3d 119, 136 (2d Cir. 2006)).
390. Id. The split, which actually entails three doctrinal positions, arguably dates back to
2006, when the Second Circuit in Snype sub silentio differed with the Seventh Circuit’s position
in United States v. Melgar, 227 F.3d 1038, 1039 (7th Cir. 2000). See also Brian Jones, Note, Keep
Closed Containers Closed: Resolving the Circuit Split in Favor of Individual Privacy, 97 IOWA L.
REV. 303 (2011) (discussing split more generally).
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Whether suspicionless collection of DNA sample is
governed by “special needs” or “totality of the
circumstances” analysis391

1999392

Whether a protective “frisk” of an auto interior,
based on Michigan v. Long (1983), is justified by
officers’ subjective or objective fear for their personal
safety393

2000394

Whether the “community caretaking” doctrine,
traditionally applicable in the auto context, permits
warrantless entry of home395

2010396

Whether impoundment of auto per “community
caretaking” doctrine, resulting in inventory, must be
based on standardized procedure397

2006398

Whether “special needs” exception justifies
warrantless strip search of juvenile399

1990400

391. United States v. Sczubelek, 402 F.3d 175, 184 (3d Cir. 2005) (noting disagreement with,
inter alia, Green v. Berge, 354 F.3d 675 (7th Cir. 2004)), cert. denied, 548 U.S. 919 (2006).
392. Roe v. Marcotte, 193 F.3d 72, 78–79 (2d Cir. 1999) (noting disagreement with Jones v.
Murray, 962 F.2d 302, 307 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 977 (1992)).
393. United States v. McGregor, 650 F.3d 813, 822 (1st Cir. 2011) (noting disagreement with,
inter alia, United States v. Brown, 188 F.3d 860, 866 (7th Cir. 1999)).
394. United States v. Wald, 216 F.3d 1222, 1227 (10th Cir. 2000); see also Brian Puchalsky,
Note, Weapon on Board? A Proposal to Solve the Riddle of the Nonprotective Search, 107 COLUM.
L. REV. 706 (2007) (discussing split more generally).
395. Ray v. Warren, 626 F.3d 170, 176–77 (3d Cir. 2010) (noting disagreement with, inter
alia, United States v. Rohrig, 98 F.3d 1506, 1509 (6th Cir. 1996)).
396. Id. Here, as elsewhere, the split can be said to actually have arisen much earlier, sub
silentio, without explicit recognition by the circuits. Compare, e.g., United States v. Rohrig, 98
F.3d 1506, 1511 (6th Cir. 1996) (extending community caretaking doctrine to justify warrantless
home entry), with United States v. Pichany, 687 F.2d 204, 208–09 (7th Cir. 1982) (rejecting
extension of the doctrine). See generally Megan Pauline Marinos, Comment, Breaking and
Entering or Community Caretaking? A Solution to the Overbroad Expansion of the Inventory
Search, 22 GEO . MASON U. C.R. L.J. 249 (2012).
397. United States v. Coccia, 446 F.3d 233, 238 (1st Cir. 2006) (noting disagreement with,
inter alia, United States v. Duguay, 93 F.3d 346, 351 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1029
(1999)), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1149 (2007).
398. Id.
399. Doe v. Tex. Dep’t of Prot. & Regulatory Servs., 299 F.3d 395, 407–08 (5th Cir. 2002).
400. Landstron v. Ill. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 892 F.2d 670, 676 (9th Cir. 1990)
(noting disagreement with Good v. Dauphin Cnty. Soc. Servs. for Children & Youth, 891 F.2d
1087, 1092 (3d Cir. 1989)).
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1199

Whether prior child sex-molestation conviction can
serve as probable cause to get child pornography
search warrant401

2010402

Whether brief submission to officer’s show of
authority, as suggested in California v. Hodari D.
(1991), constitutes seizure403

1994404

Whether a search warrant lacking in requisite
particularity can be cured by mere reference to
warrant attachment, when the attachment was not
appended to the warrant at the time of execution405

1988406

Whether police can seize an individual based on a
reasonable mistake of substantive law407

1999408

401. United States v. Colbert, 605 F.3d 573, 577 (8th Cir. 2010) (noting disagreement with,
inter alia, United States v. Falso, 544 F.3d 110, 124 (2d Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 154
(2009)), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1469 (2011).
402. Id.
403. United States v. Baldwin, 496 F.3d 215 (2d Cir. 2007) (noting disagreement with
United States v. Morgan, 936 F.3d 1561, 1567 (10th Cir. 1991)), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1222
(2008).
404. United States v. Hernandez, 27 F.3d 1403, 1407 (9th Cir. 1994) (noting disagreement
with United States v. Morgan, 936 F.2d 1561, 1566 (10th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1102
(1992)), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1171 (1995); see also Darby G. Sullivan, Note, Continuing Seizure
and the Fourth Amendment: Conceptual Discord and Evidentiary Uncertainty in United States v.
Dupree, 55 VILL . L. REV. 235 (2010) (discussing split more generally).
405. United States v. Hurwitz, 459 F.3d 463, 471 (4th Cir. 2006) (noting disagreement with,
inter alia, United States v. McGrew, 122 F.3d 847, 849 (9th Cir. 1997)). The Hurwitz court was
at pains to emphasize that Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551 (2004), did not resolve the question
because in Groh the supporting document at issue was neither incorporated by reference nor
attached to the warrant. Id. at 471.
406. United States v. Leary, 846 F.2d 592, 603 n.20 (10th Cir. 1988) (noting disagreement
with United States v. Wuagneux, 683 F.2d 1343, 1351 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 814
(1983)).
407. United States v. Washington, 455 F.3d 824, 827 n.1 (8th Cir. 2006) (noting
disagreement with, inter alia, United States v. Twilley, 222 F.3d 1092, 1096 (9th Cir. 2000)).
408. United States v. Smart, 393 F.3d 767, 770 (8th Cir.) (noting that Circuit’s reasonable
mistake of law exception was recognized in United States v. Sanders, 196 F.3d 910, 913 (8th Cir.
1999)), cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1121 (2005).
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Whether “plain view” exception in digital evidence
searches allows use of discovered evidence that
relates to other crimes409

2010410

Whether Terry frisk vitiates voluntariness of
subsequent consent to search411

2011412

Whether facts known by fellow officers, but not
communicated to officers executing search/seizure
(“collective knowledge” doctrine), can be used to
justify same413

1996414

Whether consent given by resident to confidential
informant justifies warrantless home entry by police
(“consent once removed” doctrine)415

2007416

Whether prisoners have reasonable privacy
expectation in attorney mail417

1995418

409. United States v. Mann, 592 F.3d 779, 785 (7th Cir. 2010) (noting disagreement with
United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 579 F.3d 989, 993 (9th Cir. 2009), rev’d on
other grounds, 621 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3525 (2010)).
410. Id.
411. United States v. Beauchamp, 659 F.3d 560, 578 (6th Cir. 2011) (Kethledge, J.,
dissenting) (noting disagreement with, inter alia, United States v. Dupree, 202 F.3d 1046, 1050
(8th Cir. 2000)).
412. Id.
413. United States v. Massenburg, 654 F.3d 480, 493–94 (4th Cir. 2011) (noting
disagreement with, inter alia, United States v. Ramirez, 473 F.3d 1026, 1032 (9th Cir. 2007)).
414. United States v. Shareef, 100 F.3d 1491, 1503–04 (10th Cir. 1996) (noting
disagreement with, inter alia, United States v. Edwards, 885 F.2d 377, 383 (7th Cir. 1989)).
415. United States v. Callahan, 494 F.3d 891, 897 (10th Cir. 2007) (noting disagreement
with, inter alia, United States v. Yoon, 398 F.3d 802, 807 (6th Cir. 2005)), rev’d on other grounds
sub nom. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009).
416. Id.
417. Al-Amin v. Smith, 511 F.3d 1317, 1328 (11th Cir.) (noting disagreement with Brewer v.
Wilkinson, 3 F.3d 816, 825 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1123 (1994)), cert. denied, 555
U.S. 820 (2008).
418. Biergu v. Reno, 59 F.3d 1445, 1458 (3d Cir. 1995) (noting disagreement with Brewer),
abrogated on other grounds by Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996).

1b. Logan_Ready for PAGE(Do Not Delete)

2012]

CONSTITUTIONAL CACOPHONY

10/18/2012 8:06 AM

1201

Exclusionary Rule Reach and Applicability
Standing: whether driver of rental vehicle, lacking
formal approval on rental agreement, can challenge
validity of the vehicle’s search, when renter has
given driver permission to operate vehicle419

2001420

Standing: whether defendant, in addition to having
standing to challenge primary police illegality, must
also have possessory or proprietary interest in fruit
he or she seeks to suppress421

2006422

“Inevitable discovery”: level of certitude required in
assessing if, presuming absence of illegality,
challenged evidence would have ultimately been
discovered, thus allowing for admissibility423

2006424

“Inevitable discovery”: whether an independent line
of lawful investigation must be underway at the
time of illegal discovery of evidence425

1992426

419. United States v. Kennedy, 638 F.3d 159, 166–69 (3d Cir. 2011) (noting disagreement
with, inter alia, United States v. Thomas, 447 F.3d 1191, 1198 (9th Cir. 2006)), cert. denied, 132
S. Ct. 997 (2012).
420. United States v. Smith, 263 F.3d 571, 582–86 (6th Cir. 2001) (noting disagreement
with, inter alia, United States v. Obregon, 748 F.2d 1371 (10th Cir. 1984); see also Darren M.
Goldman, Comment, Resolving a Three-Way Circuit Split: Why Unauthorized Rental Drivers
Should Be Denied Fourth Amendment Standing, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1687 (2009) (discussing split
more generally).
421. United States v. Olivares-Rangel, 458 F.3d 1104, 1118 (10th Cir. 2006) (noting
disagreement with, inter alia, United States v. Bowley, 453 F.3d 426, 431 (3d Cir. 2006)).
422. Id.
423. United States v. Heath, 455 F.3d 52, 61 (2d Cir. 2006) (noting disagreement with, inter
alia, Jefferson v. Fountain, 382 F.3d 1286, 1296 (11th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1105
(2005)).
424. Id.
425. United States v. D’Andrea, 648 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2011) (noting disagreement with,
inter alia, United States v. Cherry, 759 F.2d 1196, 1205 (5th Cir. 1985)).
426. United States v. Thomas, 955 F.2d 207, 210 (4th Cir. 1992) (noting disagreement with,
inter alia, United States v. Cherry, 759 F.2d 1196, 1205 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
1056 (1987)), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 828 (1994).
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“Attenuation”: whether discovery of lawful
outstanding arrest warrant attenuates taint of
initial unlawful seizure, allowing for admission of
evidence427

2010428

“Good faith”: whether exception applies when
affidavit supporting search warrant is tainted by
mention of evidence illegally secured429

2005430

Appellate Review
Standard for assessing trial court denial of defense
motion for evidentiary hearing under Franks v.
Delaware (1978)431

2002432

Standard for reviewing trial determination of what
constitutes curtilage433

2002434

Standard for reviewing trial court determination of
the scope of defendant’s consent to search435

2002436

427. United States v. Gross, 624 F.3d 309, 321 (6th Cir. 2010) (noting disagreement with
United States v. Johnson, 383 F.3d 538, 546 (7th Cir. 2004)), amended on other grounds, 662
F.3d 393, 404 (6th Cir. 2011).
428. Id.
429. United States v. McClain, 444 F.3d 556, 565 (6th Cir. 2005) (noting disagreement with,
inter alia, United States v. Vasey, 834 F.2d 782, 789 (9th Cir. 1987)), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1030
(2006).
430. Id.
431. United States v. Gamory, 635 F.3d 480, 490 (11th Cir.) (noting several-circuit split),
cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 826 (2011).
432. United States v. Dale, 991 F.2d 819, 843 n.44 (D.C. Cir.) (noting disagreement with,
inter alia, United States v. Hadfield, 918 F.2d 987, 992 (1st Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 936
(1991)), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1030 (1993).
433. United States v. Breza, 308 F.3d 430, 435 (4th Cir. 2002) (noting disagreement with
United States v. Benish, 5 F.3d 20, 23 (3d Cir. 1993)).
434. Id.
435. United States v. Melendez, 301 F.3d 27, 32 (1st Cir. 2002) (noting disagreement with
United States v. Stewart, 93 F.3d 189, 192 (5th Cir. 1996)).
436. Id.
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when a seizure occurs437
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1203
2003438

437. United States v. Mask, 330 F.3d 330, 335 (5th Cir. 2003) (noting disagreement with,
inter alia, United States v. Montilla, 928 F.2d 583, 588 (2d Cir. 1991)).
438. Id. The Mask court emphasized that Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690 (1996),
holding that the legality of an acknowledged seizure is subject to de novo appellate review, did
not change the Fifth Circuit’s longstanding position that whether a seizure occurred is a factual
determination subject to clear error/abuse of discretion appellate review. Id. at 335 (citing United
States v. Valdiosera-Godinez, 932 F.2d 1093, 1098 n.1 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 921
(1993)).

